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PROGRESSIVE ERA CONCEPTIONS OF THE 
CORPORATION  
AND THE FAILURE OF THE FEDERAL 
CHARTERING MOVEMENT 
Camden Hutchison* 
Despite the economic integration of the several states and 
the broad regulatory authority of the federal government, the 
internal affairs of business corporations remain primarily 
governed by state law. The origins of this system are closely 
tied to the decentralized history of the United States, but the 
reasons for its continued persistence—in the face of 
significant federalization pressures—are not obvious. Indeed, 
federalization of corporate law was a major political goal 
during the Progressive Era, a period which witnessed 
significant expansion of federal involvement in the national 
economy. By examining the historical record of Progressive 
Era policy debates, this Article bridges the analytical gap 
between historical and corporate legal scholarship, bringing 
to light the specific reasons why a federal corporation law 
was never enacted. 
Drawing on primary source evidence, the conclusions of 
this Article are as follows. First, proponents of federal 
chartering were deeply divided in their attitudes toward 
corporations, some viewing them as a dangerous threat, 
others viewing them as central to economic progress. These 
divisions led to conflicting views on the very purpose of 
corporate regulation, making agreement on the content of a 
federal corporation act unlikely. Second, notwithstanding 
these divisions, many reformers viewed corporations as 
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directly accountable to the public interest. Legislative 
proposals were therefore framed in terms of benefiting the 
public, and only secondarily addressed the shareholder 
interests that dominate corporate law today. Finally, it was 
the conflicted nature of the political support for federal 
chartering legislation—not any specific policy preference for 
maintaining corporate law federalism—that led to the 
persistence of state-based corporate law. Ultimately, the 
absence of federal corporate law was a product of historical 
circumstance, rather than any conscious determination of 
legal or economic policy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Among the most salient features of American corporate 
law is its distinctly subnational structure. Under the U.S. 
federal system, a corporation’s internal affairs—including 
the rights and obligations of its managers and 
shareholders—are governed by the substantive law of its 
state of incorporation, not that of the federal government. 
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Although the scope of federal corporate law has steadily 
increased over the decades, making notable inroads in the 
areas of securities regulation,1 proxy voting,2 gatekeeping,3 
retirement fund investments,4 certain reorganizational 
transactions,5 and—most recently—executive compensation, 
board nominations, and disclosure by hedge fund and private 
equity fund managers,6 the fundamental principles of 
corporate governance remain within the purview of the 
respective states. This traditional aspect of American 
corporate law distinguishes it from that of most developed 
countries, in which business corporations are formed and 
governed under centralized national legislation.7 
 
1  The issuance and sale of corporate securities is primarily governed 
by the federal securities laws. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–
77aa (2012); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp 
(2012). 
2  See Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: 
Lessons from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1804–07 (2006). 
3  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposed new obligations on 
corporate gatekeepers such as auditors, securities analysts, and outside 
legal counsel. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 
Stat. 745. For a discussion of corporate gatekeeping, see generally JOHN C. 
COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
(2006). 
4  The management of employee retirement plans is broadly regulated 
under federal law. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1001–1169 (2012). See generally Kimberly Lynn Weiss, Note, 
Directors’ Liability for Corporate Mismanagement of 401(k) Plans: 
Achieving the Goals of ERISA in Effectuating Retirement Security, 38 IND. 
L. REV. 817 (2005). 
5  See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 590, 
618–19 (2003). 
6  These recent federal regulations were established under the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376. Although President Trump promised to “dismantle” 
Dodd-Frank, it is uncertain whether any future reforms will affect the 
law’s corporate governance provisions. See Jeff Cox, Why It Won’t Be Easy 
for Trump to Repeal Dodd-Frank, CNBC (Nov. 21, 2016), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/21/repeal-dodd-frank-it-wont-be-easy-for-
donald-trump-to-end-the-rule.html [perma.cc/XM9F-MMB5]. 
7  A notable exception being Canada, where corporations can be 
formed under either federal or provincial law. PURI ET AL., CASES, 
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The federal structure of American corporate law figures 
centrally in corporate legal scholarship, which is 
intellectually dominated by the relationship between 
management and shareholders. Beginning with Adolf Berle 
and Gardiner Means’s seminal study of the modern 
corporation,8 and continuing with the development of 
modern finance theory in the 1960s and 1970s,9 corporate 
scholars have closely attended to this fundamental 
governance issue. This focus resulted in a long-running 
debate over the merits of state corporate law, particularly 
regarding state “competition” and the ensuing dominance of 
the state of Delaware.10 Many scholars have argued that a 
“race to the bottom” has degraded corporate governance 
standards and that Delaware has attracted corporations by 
favoring management over shareholders.11 Others have 
 
MATERIALS AND NOTES ON PARTNERSHIPS AND CANADIAN BUSINESS 
CORPORATIONS 167–68 (6th ed. 2016). See also Glenford Jameson, 
Competing with Ourselves: Supply-Side Competition for Corporate 
Charters in Canada, 50 ALTA. L. REV. 843 (2013). 
8  ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932). 
9  See THE MODERN THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 2–20 (Michael C. 
Jensen & Clifford W. Smith eds., McGraw-Hill 1984). 
10  Since corporations are essentially free to incorporate in any state of 
their choosing (regardless of geographical presence), certain states have 
tailored their laws to attract incorporation fees and franchise taxes. 
Among these states, Delaware has been far and away the most successful. 
It today serves as the legal home to more than half of all publically-traded 
U.S. corporations and nearly two-thirds of the Fortune 500. JEFFREY W. 
BULLOCK, DEL. DIV. OF CORPS., 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, 
https://corp.delaware.gov/Corporations_2013%20Annual%20Report.pdf 
[perma.cc/J67D-G4VV]. 
11  See, e.g., RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 54–
61 (1976); Oren Bar-Gill et al., The Market for Corporate Law, 162 J. INST. 
& THEOR. ECON. 134, 137–41 (2006); Lucian Bebchuk, Federalism and the 
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1440–45 (1992); Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 
2, at 1804–07; William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: 
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 663 (1974); Renee M. Jones, 
Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. 
CORP. L. 625, 653 (2004); Stanley A. Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in 
the Management of the Corporation, 31 BUS. LAW. 883, 885–87 (1976); 
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argued that Delaware’s success is instead the result of a 
“race to the top,” and that Delaware has provided the most 
efficient balance between shareholder protection and 
management prerogative.12 More recently, a number of 
scholars have questioned the assumption that states actually 
compete for incorporations at all, based on evidence that 
Delaware has enjoyed an effective monopoly on out-of-state 
incorporations for several decades (tempered only by the 
periodic threat of federal legislation).13 Regardless of their 
 
Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 545, 556 (1984); Gordon G. Young, Federal Corporate Law, 
Federalism, and the Federal Courts, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1997, 
at 146, 151. 
12  See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 212–27 (1991); ROBERTA 
ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); RALPH K. 
WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 28–42 (1978); Barry D. 
Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of 
the Firm, 28 J.L. & ECON. 179, 184–90 (1985); Robert Daines, Does 
Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 527 (2001); 
Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent 
Developments in Delaware’s Corporate Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 913 
(1982); Roberta Romano, Corporate Law as the Paradigm for Contractual 
Choice of Law, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 370 (F. 
Buckley ed., 1999); Roberta Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the 
Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 226 (1985); Ralph K. 
Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254 (1977). 
13  See, e.g., Robert Anderson IV & Jeffrey Manns, The Delaware 
Delusion, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1092–94 (2015); Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf 
Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition 
over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 555 (2002); Marcel Kahan & 
Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 679, 684–85 (2002); Roe, supra note 5, at 590. Increasingly, 
scholars characterize the market for incorporations as a binary “local 
versus Delaware” market, in which firms incorporate either in the state in 
which they are headquartered (for example, a Wisconsin-based corporation 
incorporating under Wisconsin law) or in Delaware (a Wisconsin-based 
corporation incorporating under Delaware law). A common view is that no 
states (with the possible recent exception of Nevada) even attempt to 
compete with Delaware for out-of-state incorporations. See Bruce H. 
Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Nevada and the Market for Corporate 
Law, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1165, 1167–68 (2012). 
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specific perspectives on the state corporate law debate, most 
of these scholars share two basic intellectual premises: (1) 
state law provides the foundational legal rules into which 
federal policy may selectively intervene; and (2) corporate 
law should primarily focus on the economic interests of 
shareholders. The positive corollaries of these premises—the 
absence of comprehensive federal corporate law and the 
limitation of management’s duties to shareholders 
exclusively—are largely taken for granted, implicitly 
portrayed as natural results of the American federal system 
of government.14 
In fact, neither premise commanded appreciable support 
during the formative period of modern corporate law. By 
examining Progressive Era political debates over federal 
incorporation proposals, this Article shows that there was 
nothing preordained about the state-based system of 
corporate governance. At the turn of the twentieth century, 
amidst dramatic growth of industrial corporations, the 
possibility of federal chartering became a national political 
issue. Federal chartering proposals, which—in their various 
forms—would have added to, limited, or completely replaced 
state corporation statutes, enjoyed the support of two sitting 
presidents, both major political parties, and a broad array of 
 
14  It should be emphasized that this naturalized view is the dominant 
perspective in the legal literature. Historians of American business have 
often conceptualized corporations (and corporate law) much differently. 
For prominent examples of the variety of historical approaches to 
corporations, see, e.g., JOHN WILLIAM CADMAN, JR., THE CORPORATION IN 
NEW JERSEY: BUSINESS AND POLITICS, 1791–1875 (1949); ALFRED D. 
CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN 
AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); NAOMI LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER 
MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895–1904 (1985); GLENN PORTER, THE 
RISE OF BIG BUSINESS, 1860–1920 (1973); CONSTRUCTING CORPORATE 
AMERICA: HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE (Kenneth Lipartito & David B. 
Sicilia eds., 2004); Colleen Dunlavy, How Did American Business Get So 
Big?, AUDACITY, Spring 1994, at 41; Colleen Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of 
the Corporation: Insights from the History of Shareholder Voting Rights, 
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 (2006); Oscar Handlin & Mary Handlin, 
Origins of the American Business Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1945); 
Charles W. McCurdy, American Law and the Marketing Structure of the 
Large Corporation, 1875–1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631 (1978). 
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political interests, including big business, organized labor, 
and the national agricultural lobby. The policy concerns of 
this federalization movement were unlike those of corporate 
law today, however. Rather than focusing on the conflict of 
interest between professional management and 
shareholders, Progressive Era reformers addressed 
themselves to much broader questions of political economy, 
including the fundamental nature of the corporation’s role in 
modern industrial society. In seeking to directly regulate 
large business corporations, Progressive Era proposals 
implicated the power of both managers and shareholders, 
the economic interests of which were only rarely 
differentiated. Given their ambitious regulatory agenda, had 
Progressive Era reformers succeeded in passing federal 
chartering legislation, the institutional structure of 
American business would look much different than it does 
today. 
This Article focuses on the historical moment in which 
federalization had the strongest political support: the period 
beginning with the “Great Merger Movement” of 1895–1904 
and ending with the creation of the Federal Trade 
Commission (the “FTC”) in 1914. These years were marked 
by deep anxiety over the rise of national corporations and by 
a strong sense among American policymakers of confronting 
unprecedented economic change. In examining the responses 
to this change, this Article follows several prior studies of the 
period: beyond the canonical historiography of the 
Progressive Era itself,15 historians such as Gabriel Kolko, 
Martin Sklar, and Melvin Urofsky have specifically 
 
15  The classic work on the Progressive Era (as well as the Populist 
movement and the early New Deal) remains RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE 
AGE OF REFORM (1955). Other important works include: SAMUEL P. HAYS, 
THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1885–1914 (1957); MICHAEL MCGERR, 
A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 
IN AMERICA 1870–1920 (2003); DANIEL T. ROGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: 
SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE (2000); ROBERT H. WIEBE, 
BUSINESSMEN AND REFORM: A STUDY OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT (1962) 
[hereinafter BUSINESSMEN AND REFORM]; ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH 
FOR ORDER, 1877–1920 (1967), as well as many others. 
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addressed progressive efforts to federalize corporate law.16 
The Article extends beyond these previous studies in two 
important respects. First, it pays greater attention to the 
legal details of the period’s specific reform proposals. Second, 
by comparing these proposals with more recent 
developments in conceptions of the corporation, it more 
clearly reveals that federalization efforts did not represent a 
unified political movement, but rather embodied divergent 
conceptions of corporations’ role in American society. Melvin 
Urofsky, for example, who has authored the most specific 
study of the federal incorporation movement to date, is 
unable to satisfactorily explain why the movement failed, 
arguing only that “a consensus on broad goals could not be 
translated into agreement on specific details.”17 This Article 
shows that federal incorporation proposals were actually 
characterized by dissensus, and that different reformers 
often advocated irreconcilable policy goals. This political 
dissensus better explains the federalization movement’s 
ultimate failure and the resulting entrenchment of the state 
law system in the absence of federal legislation. 
Specifically, by drawing on the historical record of federal 
chartering proposals, this Article makes three central 
arguments. First, although federal incorporation as an 
abstract concept enjoyed broad political support, it was 
undermined by a fundamental conflict between what this 
Article labels “anti-corporate” and “corporatist” ideologies.18 
“Anti-corporate” populists viewed large corporations as a 
 
16 See  GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963); MARTIN 
J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 
1890–1916 (1988); Melvin Urofsky, Proposed Federal Incorporation in the 
Progressive Era, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 160 (1982). See also Theodore H. 
Davis, Jr., Corporate Privileges for the Public Benefit: The Progressive 
Federal Incorporation Movement and the Modern Regulatory State, 77 VA. 
L. REV. 603 (1991). 
17  Urofsky, supra note 16, at 160. 
18  In this Article, “corporatism” is defined as cooperative management 
of the national economy by government and large corporations. This 
definition is distinct from—though not unrelated to—the conventional 
definition of corporatism in political theory (i.e., the organization of society 
through cooperation among major interest groups). 
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dangerous threat to economic freedom and saw federal 
legislation as a means of supplanting overly permissive state 
corporation acts. “Corporatist” progressives, on the other 
hand, viewed large corporations as central to economic 
progress and saw federal legislation as a means of 
supplanting overly restrictive state corporation acts. Second, 
notwithstanding this core conflict, many reformers on both 
sides of the debate believed corporate regulation should 
serve the public interest and were therefore only secondarily 
concerned with the economic interests of shareholders. At a 
time when public shareholding was more limited, the conflict 
of interest between management and shareholders was a less 
significant policy issue. Finally, it was the conflicted nature 
of the political support for federal chartering legislation, not 
any specific policy preference for maintaining corporate law 
federalism, that ultimately ensured the continued existence 
of the state corporate law regime. In other words, the state-
based structure of American corporate law was a default 
outcome, not an active choice. 
Together, these conclusions illustrate a broader historical 
phenomenon—that institutional features of the American 
economy are often shaped not by popular will, technocratic 
expertise, or even special interest preferences, but simply by 
the contingent nature of legislative politics.19 Regardless of 
whether Delaware law is economically superior to its 
alternatives (a question this Article does not address), its 
prominence was hardly predetermined by the genius of 
American federalism. Had early debates over federal 
chartering occurred under different political circumstances, 
the evolution of corporate law would likely have unfolded 
differently. 
Before proceeding, a note on terminology: In order to 
capture all major proposals to impose federal standards on 
corporate law, this Article employs a catholic definition of 
federal “chartering” proposals. Specifically, the term 
“chartering” includes any legislative proposal to (1) require 
 
19  For an example of this phenomenon in the tax policy context, see 
Camden Hutchison, The Historical Origins of the Debt-Equity Distinction, 
18 FLA. TAX REV. 95 (2015). 
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or permit businesses to incorporate under federal charters, 
(2) require or permit businesses to obtain federal corporate 
licenses, or (3) impose comprehensive federal standards on 
the governance of state corporations. Although distinct in 
form, these various legislative proposals were often similar 
in substance, as each sought to replace—in whole or in 
part—the variety of state laws with federal standardization. 
A mandatory licensing system requiring compliance with 
federal standards, for example, is little different from 
imposing those standards directly though federal 
incorporation. Thus, this Article includes each type of 
proposal as part of a single federalization movement. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II 
discusses the rise of corporate chartermongering and early 
calls for federal reform. This Part explores the diversity of 
perspectives that characterized early federalization 
proposals. Part III examines the major federalization 
proposals debated during the Theodore Roosevelt 
Administration. This was the moment at which the political 
conflict between corporatist and anti-corporate perspectives 
was most stark. Part IV discusses the failure of 
federalization proposals under William Howard Taft and the 
effective end of the chartering movement following the 
election of Woodrow Wilson. Part V concludes, assessing the 
relevance of federalization efforts to current U.S. corporate 
law. 
II. STATE CORPORATE CHARTERMONGERING 
AND CALLS FOR FEDERAL REFORM 
Since the origins of the United States, the formation of 
corporations has been a subject of state law. At the 
Constitutional Convention, James Madison proposed 
empowering Congress “to grant charters of incorporation 
where the interest of the U.S. might require & the legislative 
provisions of individual States may be incompetent.”20 
 
20  James Madison, Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 (Sept. 
14, 1787), in AVALON PROJECT (2017), 
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Madison’s proposal was rejected, however, on the grounds 
that federal corporations might lead to national monopolies. 
21 Thus, although the federal government has chartered 
specific corporations under the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
including the first and second Banks of the United States, 
the first transcontinental railroads, and the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, general incorporation of private businesses 
has remained limited to the states. To this day, nearly all 
American corporations are chartered under state law, a 
distinctive feature of American corporate governance. 
During the nineteenth century, states facilitated 
incorporation to promote local economic development. The 
economic and technological advances of the post-Civil War 
decades allowed locally incorporated businesses to grow 
increasingly national in scope. As markets expanded and 
geographical distances shrank, states encountered 
constitutional obstacles to regulating “foreign,” or out-of-
state corporations.22 Not only did the Commerce Clause limit 
state interference with interstate commerce, but under 
established legal doctrine, a corporation’s internal affairs 
were governed by its state of incorporation, regardless of the 
geographical location of its business, assets, or operational 
headquarters.23 Since corporate promoters24 were free to 
incorporate in any state of their choosing, and since states 
collected fees and taxes for the granting of corporate 
charters, the circumstances emerged for states to compete to 
attract out-of-state incorporations. New Jersey was the first 
and most successful of these states, attracting the majority of 
the largest combinations formed during the Great Merger 
 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_914.asp#16 
[perma.cc/4XDL-34V7]. 
21  Id. 
22  See, e.g., Norfolk & W.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U.S. 114, 120 
(1890) (invalidating a Pennsylvania tax on foreign corporations).  
23  For analysis of the historical origins of the corporate internal 
affairs doctrine, see generally Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins 
of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP. L. 33 (2006). 
24  “Promoters” was the historical term for the owners, managers, and 
financial intermediaries who organized incorporations, particularly for 
public investment. 
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Movement.25 Certain states—such as Delaware, Maine, and 
West Virginia—attempted to compete with New Jersey by 
liberalizing their corporation laws.26 Other states—such as 
Ohio, Illinois, and Massachusetts—continued to maintain 
their traditional restrictions on corporations’ size and 
business activities.27 As discussed below, this legal diversity 
contributed to the conflicted nature of the federal chartering 
movement: Simply put, certain proponents of federal 
legislation were opposed to the laws of states like Ohio, while 
other proponents of federal legislation were opposed to the 
laws of states like New Jersey. 
A. New Jersey Chartermongering 
New Jersey was the original winner of the “race” to 
attract incorporations. In 1846, New Jersey enacted a 
general incorporation law intended to facilitate capital 
formation, providing corporations greater structural freedom 
than many larger industrial states.28 Revisions in 1875 
provided even greater flexibility, while also eliminating the 
 
25  For a listing of all “trusts” existing as of 1904, the majority of which 
were incorporated in New Jersey, see JOHN MOODY, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE 
TRUSTS 453–75 (1904). For detailed figures on incorporations in New 
Jersey, see also Charles Yablon, The Historical Race Competition for 
Corporate Charters and the Rise and Decline of New Jersey: 1880–1910, 32 
J. CORP L. 323, 377–80 (2007). 
26  See Yablon, supra note 25, at 359–67. 
27  For contemporaneous discussions of relatively restrictive state 
laws, see 1 INDUSTR. COMM’N, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON TRUSTS AND 
INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS, TOGETHER WITH TESTIMONY, REVIEW OF 
EVIDENCE, CHARTS SHOWING EFFECTS OF PRICES, AND TOPICAL DIGEST 297–
330, 1035, 1133–34 (1900) [hereinafter INDUSTR. COMM’N, PRELIMINARY 
REPORT]. These laws could have significant consequences for in-state 
corporations. For example, Standard Oil Company was sued—and nearly 
dissolved—by the Ohio attorney general for actions considered ultra vires 
under Ohio’s corporation law. Standard Oil Company subsequently 
reorganized under the holding company Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey. 
28  See Edward Quinton Keasbey, Address to Chicago Conference on 
Trusts: New Jersey and the Trusts (Sept. 15, 1899), in CHICAGO 
CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS: SPEECHES, DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS, LISTS OF THE 
DELEGATES, COMMITTEES, ETC. 383 (Civic Fed’n of Chi. ed., 1900) 
[hereinafter CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS]. 
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traditional practice of incorporation by special legislative 
act.29 In addition to its liberal corporation statute, New 
Jersey also benefited from low corporate taxes and a well-
regarded conservative judiciary.30 For these reasons, New 
Jersey had become an attractive destination for corporations 
even before the 1880s.31 Building on its existing reputation 
as a corporate-friendly jurisdiction, New Jersey emerged as 
the earliest state to actively promote itself to out-of-state 
capital.32 
Legislative reforms in the late 1880s and 1890s solidified 
New Jersey’s position as the jurisdiction of choice for large 
industrial corporations. The most significant of these reforms 
were devised by James B. Dill, a talented and ambitious 
Wall Street attorney who lived across the river in New 
Jersey. In 1890, Dill suggested to Leon Abbett, the 
Democratic governor of New Jersey (and a former corporate 
attorney himself), that New Jersey further revise its 
corporation laws.33 At the time, Abbett was in search of 
additional tax revenue to balance New Jersey’s budget 
 
29  Id. at 386. Historically, incorporation by a specific legislative act 
had been the typical means of forming a corporation, but this practice fell 
into public disfavor by the middle of the nineteenth century. During the 
Jacksonian era, many Americans viewed special incorporation as an 
instrument of privilege and monopoly, and nearly every state eliminated 
the practice by the latter decades of the century. See Gregory A. Mark, The 
Role of the State in Corporate Law Formation, in 1 INTERNATIONAL 
CORPORATE LAW ANNUAL 1, 5–9 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2000). 
30  New Jersey’s corporate franchise tax was levied at a maximum rate 
of 0.1% of paid-in capital, with decreasing marginal rates for increasingly 
greater capitalizations. For large corporations, this resulted in a lower 
effective tax rate than (for example) New York’s. For contemporary 
discussion of New Jersey’s corporation taxes, see 2 INDUSTR. COMM’N, 
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON TRUSTS AND INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS, TOGETHER 
WITH TESTIMONY, REVIEW OF EVIDENCE, CHARTS SHOWING EFFECTS OF 
PRICES, AND TOPICAL DIGEST 21, 975, 1077 (1899). According to the 
journalist Lincoln Steffens, the New Jersey judiciary was highly regarded 
by Wall Street lawyers. Lincoln Steffens, New Jersey: A Traitor State, 
MCCLURE’S MAG., Apr. 1905, at 649, 658. 
31  See Yablon, supra note 25, at 332–36. 
32  Id. at 328. 
33  Urofsky, supra note 16, at 163. 
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deficit, while Dill was seeking a streamlined mechanism for 
organizing his clients’ businesses; the two men quickly 
agreed on a mutually beneficial reform program.34 Pursuant 
to Dill’s plan, which Abbett recommended to the state 
legislature, New Jersey revised its corporation act in 1893 so 
as to clearly authorize New Jersey corporations to acquire 
the stock and/or assets of out-of-state firms.35 Three years 
later, in 1896, the entire act was fully recodified by a revision 
commission chaired by Dill.36 This recodification, which 
significantly streamlined the act’s requirements, is widely 
considered the first modern “enabling” corporation statute.37 
The new statute played an important role in facilitating 
corporate mergers, as reflected by New Jersey’s prominent 
position in the growing national merger movement.38 
Between 1895 and 1904, approximately 50% of all industrial 
 
34  See The Lawyer Who Earned Title of Being Father of the Trusts, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 1907, at 6. There is also evidence that Abbett and 
other New Jersey politicians were able to reap personal financial benefits 
from Dill’s reform plan. Together with Dill, Abbett was a stockholder in 
the Corporation Trust Company of New Jersey, a company founded by Dill 
to facilitate New Jersey incorporations. Urofsky, supra note 16, at 163. 
35  Act of Mar. 14, 1893, ch. 171, 1893 N.J. Laws 301 (providing for 
general intercorporate stockholding). Although previous scholars have 
written that New Jersey’s first “holding company” laws were passed in 
1888 and 1889, these earlier laws were of only narrow application. See Act 
of Apr. 4, 1888, ch. 269, 1888 N.J. Laws 385 (providing, redundantly, that 
corporations “authorized by law to own and hold shares of stock and bonds 
of corporations” could hold and dispose of the same); Act of Apr. 17, 1888, 
ch. 295, 1888 N.J. Laws 445 (providing for intercorporate stockholding by 
certain real estate and transportation corporations). A law passed in 1889 
was broader, but seemed limited to mining and manufacturing companies. 
See Act of May 9, 1889, ch. 265, 1889 N.J. Laws 412. Additional industry-
specific laws were passed in 1891. The 1893 law was the first 
unambiguous authorization to purchase and hold the stock of any 
corporation, in any industry, whether or not formed in New Jersey. 
36  Urofsky, supra note 16, at 163–64. 
37  As opposed to the restrictive statutes that constituted the historical 
norm. See Yablon, supra note 25, at 349–53. 
38  The new statute was enacted as an act concerning corporations. Act 
of Apr. 21, 1986, ch. 185, 1896 N.J. Laws 277. 
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consolidations were incorporated in New Jersey;39 between 
1896 and 1901, the state’s annual incorporations increased 
nearly 200%;40 and by 1904, all seven of John Moody’s 
“greater industrial trusts” had incorporated in New Jersey.41 
These developments had a major effect on New Jersey’s 
corporate tax revenue, which more than tripled from less 
than one million dollars in 1895 to nearly three million 
dollars in 1905.42 By any measure, Dill’s plan was a 
remarkable success. 
As New Jersey attracted a growing share of the nation’s 
largest corporations, other states took notice. Hoping to 
capture a portion of New Jersey’s rising incorporation 
revenues, states including Maine, South Dakota, and West 
Virginia passed corporation laws that were even less 
restrictive than New Jersey’s.43 Delaware adopted a 
corporation act nearly identical to the New Jersey statute, 
attempting to compete for corporations by charging lower 
fees and franchise taxes.44 Even highly industrialized states 
such as New York and Massachusetts were forced to revise 
their corporate laws to avoid losing corporations to New 
Jersey.45 With several states actively vying to attract and 
 
39  RALPH L. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 
1895–1956, at 67 (1959). 
40  Urofsky, supra note 16, at 164. 
41  MOODY, supra note 25, at 453. These firms were: Amalgamated 
Copper Company, American Smelting and Refining Co., American Sugar 
Refining Co., Consolidated Tobacco Co., International Merchant Marine 
Company, Standard Oil Company, and United States Steel Company. Id. 
42  Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 
1875–1929, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 677, 682 (1989). 
43  See Yablon, supra note 25, at 358–67. 
44  Grandy, supra note 42, at 685. Although the two acts were very 
similar (Delaware lawyers expressly marketed their state’s act as being 
based on the New Jersey act), Delaware law was more permissive with 
respect to the sale of stock, the location of corporate meetings, and certain 
other specific provisions. See William Jennings Bryan, Address to Chicago 
Conference on Trusts: The Man Before the Dollar (Sept. 16, 1899), in 
CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, at 494, 506–08. Of course, 
Delaware would eventually replace New Jersey as the preferred 
incorporation jurisdiction. 
45  See Yablon, supra note 25, at 358–67, 370–71. 
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retain corporations, this period represented the historical 
peak of state corporate law competition. 
For many contemporary observers, this competition was 
cause for alarm. At the turn of the century, public attitudes 
toward corporations were dominated by antitrust sentiment, 
and the liberalizing reforms of individual states were seen as 
enabling monopolistic trusts. Although the Sherman Act of 
1890 prohibited efforts to monopolize,46 many Americans 
feared indulgent state governments were nonetheless 
encouraging dangerous consolidation.47 A famous example of 
this view was the muckraking journalism of Lincoln Steffens, 
whose McClure’s Magazine article New Jersey: A Traitor 
State accused New Jersey politicians of betraying the 
country in exchange for local tax revenues.48 According to 
Steffens, New Jersey was fostering national monopolies in 
order to maximize tax collections—a specific example of a 
broader phenomenon of corrupt, parochial-minded state 
government. Fearing the economic consequences of 
permissive state corporation laws, many in American politics 
began to call for federal standards. In the late 1890s, these 
calls led to serious discussions regarding the desirability and 
constitutionality of a federal corporate chartering act. The 
two most prominent examples—each highlighting a different 
perspective on the fundamental goals of corporate 
regulation—were the Chicago Conference on Trusts, held in 
1899, and the proceedings of the U.S. Industrial 
Commission, held from 1898 to 1902. 
B. The Chicago Conference on Trusts 
At the end of the nineteenth century, Americans were 
keenly aware of the economic changes occurring around 
them. The traditional economic model of small, independent 
 
46  Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). 
47  This concern is suggested by William Jennings Bryan’s comments, 
see infra notes 56–61 and accompanying text, which were received with 
“some minutes” of applause and a “crowd which rushed forward to 
congratulate him.”  Bryan supra note 44, at 514. 
48  Steffens, supra note 30, at 649–50. 
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businesses—central to the economic ideology of nineteenth-
century America—was rapidly ceding to a new reality of 
large, integrated corporations, many of which had dominated 
their industries in the span of only a few short years. 
Concern over these corporations’ economic power led to state 
and federal antitrust legislation, as well as calls for the 
federal government to assume direct control over 
corporations themselves. In this respect, the antitrust 
movement and federal chartering proposals were closely 
interrelated. Although today the word “trust” connotes 
economic monopoly—and “antitrust” connotes anti-monopoly 
policy—the popular meaning of both of these terms was 
significantly broader during the Progressive Era.49 In both 
the public and political vernacular of the time, a “trust” was 
simply any large corporation, while “corporation” could refer 
to any large trust. The “trust” issue in American politics was 
therefore synonymous with the “corporation” issue, and 
“antitrust” policy concerned any business that operated on a 
national scale. As stated by James B. Dill, the popular (if 
legally inaccurate) understanding of the term “trust” was 
simply “a corporate aggregation engaged in business other 
than merely local, and not confined in its operations and 
scope to the state of its creation.”50 
Although Congress had responded to growing antitrust 
sentiment with the Sherman Act of 1890, limited 
enforcement of the statute’s prohibitions had produced 
equally limited results.51 As concern over the trust issue 
continued to mount—and as state law appeared increasingly 
ineffective—many public figures began to advocate more 
 
49  The term “trust” was originally a reference to the practice of 
organizing large businesses as actual legal trusts. The legal motivations 
for this practice were obviated by the liberalization of state corporate law, 
after which most trusts reorganized as corporations. The general public 
continued to refer to all large businesses as trusts, however. 
50  James B. Dill, National Incorporation Laws for Trusts, 11 YALE L.J. 
273, 274–75 (1902). 
51  While outright cartelization declined, industrial consolidation 
significantly increased in the decade following the Sherman Act. See HANS 
B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINS OF AN AMERICAN 
TRADITION 285–308 (1955). 
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ambitious policy alternatives. It was in this context that the 
Civic Federation of Chicago, a major business reform 
organization, convened the Chicago Conference on Trusts 
late in the summer of 1899. The conference assembled a wide 
range of figures from government, academics, journalism, 
labor, the legal profession, and elsewhere to discuss potential 
legal and political responses to the rise of national trusts. 
The conference’s stated objective was not to attack the 
trusts, but merely to facilitate the exchange of ideas. In the 
words of Franklin Head, President of the Civic Federation of 
Chicago, “it is not a trust or an anti-trust conference, but a 
conference in search of truth and light.”52 In this spirit, an 
impressive variety of ideological perspectives were 
represented at the conference, from socialists to laissez-faire 
conservatives, and everything in-between. National political 
and intellectual figures including William Jennings Bryan, 
Bourke Cockran, Samuel Gompers, John Bates Clark, 
Jeremiah Jenks, and even James B. Dill each presented 
their particular views on how best to address the trust issue. 
Notwithstanding this diversity, federal incorporation or 
licensing of corporations emerged as a common policy 
proposal. The conference was therefore the first occasion for 
sustained discussion of federal chartering, laying the 
groundwork for subsequent developments within the federal 
government itself. 
The general sentiment of the conference was that state 
corporate law was seriously inadequate. Regardless of their 
specific perspectives on the dangers and/or benefits of 
industrial combination, most conferees agreed that some 
form of federal regulation was necessary. In general, what 
drove this agreement was not primarily concern for corporate 
investors, whose economic interests were rarely recognized 
as distinct from those of corporate management. In 1899—
still the early days of public shareholding—the separation of 
ownership and control was a less prominent feature of 
 
52  Franklin J. Head, President, Civic Fed’n of Chi., Address to 
Chicago Conference on Trusts (Sept. 13, 1899), in CHICAGO CONFERENCE 
ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, at 7. 
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American corporations.53 While participants at the 
conference had various reasons for supporting federal 
legislation, a common concern was protecting the public from 
concentrated economic power. Given the liberalization of 
state corporate law and the rapid growth of national 
combinations, many conferees feared that individual state 
governments had abandoned their responsibility to the 
public interest. 
This fear reflected a conception of corporations much 
different from that of modern legal scholarship. Rather than 
viewing the corporate form as an enabling mechanism for 
private enterprise—the mainstream academic view of 
corporations today—many at the time continued to view 
corporations as quasi-public instruments of the state, whose 
legal privileges were predicated upon provision of a public 
benefit. According to several conferees, corporations had 
become dangerous because they were no longer limited to 
public purposes: Since states such as New Jersey had 
authorized corporations to engage in any lawful business, 
their statutory legal advantages (limited liability, continual 
existence, etc.) allowed them to dominate the American 
economy.54 This view of corporations as instruments of 
public policy—and the implicit rejection of private profit as a 
legitimate public policy goal—would significantly influence 
political debates over the proper purposes of federal 
chartering. 
 
53  Although the Great Merger Movement represented the beginning of 
public shareholding of industrial corporations, truly widespread public 
shareholding would not emerge until the 1920s. See JONATHAN BARRON 
BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 193–97 
(1997). 
54  See, e.g., Dudley G. Wooten, Member, Texas Legislature, Address to 
Chicago Conference on Trusts (Sept. 13, 1899), in CHICAGO CONFERENCE 
ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, at 42; Henry White, General Secretary, United 
Garment Workers of America, Address to Chicago Conference on Trusts 
(Sept. 15, 1899), in CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS 323; John B. Conner, 
Chief, Indiana Bureau of Statistics, Address to Chicago Conference on 
Trusts (Sept. 13, 1899), in CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, 
at  340. 
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The conception of corporations that characterized the 
Chicago conference is well illustrated by its most famous 
attendee, the once and future presidential candidate William 
Jennings Bryan. While many speakers at the Chicago 
conference issued general calls for federal reform, Bryan 
presented a more specific proposal for a federal corporate 
licensing system. Speaking before a packed, enthusiastic 
audience the morning of September 16, 1899, Bryan began 
by outlining the failings of state corporate law.55 Using the 
example of Delaware, which was eagerly attempting to 
compete with New Jersey, Bryan claimed that irresponsible 
state governments were fostering dangerous economic 
concentration. In Bryan’s dramatic rhetoric, the interests of 
natural “God-made man” were being sacrificed to 
corporations, “the man-made man.”56 To emphasize his 
point, Bryan read his audience an advertisement from a 
Delaware incorporation service that extolled the lack of legal 
restrictions in Delaware’s general corporation act.57 Bryan 
maintained that such brazen appeals to trust-promoters 
were clear evidence that state governments were 
disregarding the public interest. According to Bryan, since 
Delaware and other chartermongering states were 
financially motivated to favor corporations, “protection of the 
public from the greed and avarice of great aggregations of 
wealth” required national legislation.58 
Bryan’s own proposal was legislation requiring all 
corporations in interstate commerce to apply for and 
maintain a federal license. In order to control the “man-made 
man,” this license would be predicated on three 
requirements: (1) licensees would be prohibited from having 
 
55  Bryan was an extremely popular orator, as evidenced by his 
reception at the conference. See, e.g., CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS 459, 
494, 496, 514. 
56  Bryan, supra note 44, at 510–11. 
57  Id. at 503–05. 
58  Id. at 508. 
HUTCHISON – FINAL 
No. 3:1017]  PROGRESSIVE ERA CONCEPTIONS OF THE CORPORATION 1037 
any “watered stock” in their capital structure;59 (2) licensees 
would be prohibited from having a monopoly in any line of 
business; and (3) licensees would be required to disclose the 
details of their business operations.60 Each of these 
conditions was meant to protect the public, rather than 
investors—Bryan spoke in general terms of the dangers of 
“corporations” and made no distinction between investors 
and management. To modern readers, requiring financial 
disclosure and prohibiting the sale of overvalued stock may 
seem like investor protection measures, but this was not 
Bryan’s goal. In the assessment of Bryan and many of his 
contemporaries, these measures would actually prevent 
investors from profiting at public expense. 
This became clear in the controversy over “watered 
stock,” or the practice of selling stock for more than the value 
of a company’s assets. The central concern was not that 
investors were being defrauded, as one might assume. 
Rather, since dividend payments were often set at a fixed 
percentage of nominal par value, inflated capital values 
increased the pressure on management to maximize profits 
in order to satisfy the cash flow requirements of high fixed-
dividend obligations.61 According to many critics, pressure to 
pay higher dividends was the reason for (allegedly) 
monopolistic prices.62 Although there was also worry that 
outside shareholders might be deceived by inflated stock 
 
59  The sale of “watered stock”—stock issued in excess of the value of a 
corporation’s assets—was one of the most controversial corporate practices 
of the period. See infra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
60  Bryan, supra note 44, at 506–08. 
61  The payment of dividends on common stock was not a legal 
obligation. However, given the information asymmetries that 
characterized early American securities markets, steady payment of fixed 
dividends was an important signal to investors of financial health. See 
BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 53, at 5–7. 
62  See, e.g., Cyrus G. Luce, Former Governor of Michigan, Address to 
Chicago Conference on Trusts (Sept. 14, 1899), in CHICAGO CONFERENCE 
ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, at 230, 231–32; Bryan, supra note 44, at 496, 
506–08; T. B. Walker, Minneapolis Board of Trade, Address to Chicago 
Conference on Trusts: Trusts From a Business Man’s Standpoint (Sept. 16, 
1899), in CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, at 539, 539–41. 
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values, the greater concern was that elevated dividends were 
effectively a wealth transfer from consumers to investors. 
Again, this historical understanding of corporate finance 
differs significantly from the modern view, which is 
primarily concerned with corporate management failing to 
maximize returns to investors. Indeed, there is even an 
ironic parallel between this early conception of dividend 
obligations and the claim by modern financial economists 
that debt service obligations can discipline management.63 
The requirement of corporate disclosure, referred to by 
Bryan as “publicity,” was also conceived primarily as a 
means of protecting the public welfare. Bryan was not alone 
in calling for disclosure—“publicity” was a major goal of 
reformers throughout the Progressive Era. Unlike the 
modern conception of corporate disclosure, publicity was not 
viewed as a form of investor protection, but rather as a 
mechanism for preventing monopolistic profits. Bryan stated 
confidently that publicity would benefit the consuming 
public, even if his basis for this prediction was not entirely 
clear. Without explaining how or why, Bryan merely 
asserted that corporate publicity would represent a “long 
step toward the destruction of monopoly.”64 Parsing Bryan’s 
rhetoric, the implication seemed to be that once the public 
learned the details of corporations’ profits, they would no 
longer tolerate excessive prices.65 Bryan’s contemporaries 
were rarely clearer in justifying publicity’s importance, 
though they presented it as a panacea for a host of economic 
issues. As a general matter, anti-corporate populists were 
often vague in explaining the benefits of their proposals, 
 
63  The theory that leverage can discipline management was first 
advanced by Michael Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 
ECON. 305 (1976). Although not uncontroversial, this theory remains 
influential in financial economics. 
64  Bryan, supra note 44, at 508.  
65  Id. A more economically plausible theory is that disclosure of high 
profits would attract new competition, thus lowering prices. This theory 
(expressed in somewhat inchoate language) was occasionally advanced by 
other Progressive Era reformers. 
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which often entailed unacknowledged conflicts between the 
economic interests of consumers and investors. 
Given his influence within the Democratic Party and his 
broader prominence in American politics, Bryan represents a 
particularly important example of the anti-corporate political 
perspective. However, many other figures at the Chicago 
conference also expressed similar views. To name but a few, 
Representative Francis G. Newlands (D-NV), who would 
subsequently introduce several chartering bills in Congress, 
argued that state regulation of corporations was “impossible” 
and that only the federal government could control corporate 
power.66 Henry C. Adams, professor of political economy at 
Cornell University and statistician for the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, strongly criticized state corporation 
laws for failing to protect the public welfare.67 A. E. Rogers, 
a professor of constitutional law at the University of Maine, 
issued similar criticisms and called for the imposition of 
federal standards.68 In their preference for federal over state 
legislation, all of these speakers were more concerned with 
protecting the public than with protecting investors. In the 
words of attorney R. S. Taylor, “the interests of investors in 
the shares of [trusts] is a small consideration beside the 
interest of the general mass of people whose food, clothing, 
and transportation are controlled by them.”69 Ultimately, the 
chairman of the conference, William Howe, remarked during 
the closing of discussions that nearly every participant—
whatever their political views—agreed on the importance of 
national standards. Howe summarized the conference as 
 
66  Representative Francis G. Newlands, Address to Chicago 
Conference on Trusts (Sept. 14, 1899), in CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS, 
supra note 28, at 305, 306. 
67  See Henry C. Adams, Statistician, Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 
Address to Chicago Conference on Trusts (Sept. 13, 1899), in CHICAGO 
CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, at 35, 39. 
68  A. E. Rogers, Univ. of Me., Address to Chicago Conference on 
Trusts (Sept. 15, 1899), in CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, 
at 409, 422. 
69  R. S. Taylor, Attorney, Address to Chicago Conference on Trusts 
(Sept. 13, 1899), in CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, at 72, 
72. 
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having established the necessity of (1) strong, uniform 
antitrust legislation, (2) centralized control over the 
formation of corporations, (3) stricter regulation of the sale of 
stock and bonds, and (4) a uniform system of corporate 
publicity.70 According to Howe, the message of the conference 
was that corporations should be controlled “as we control 
steam and electricity, which are also dangerous if not 
carefully managed, but of wonderful usefulness if rightly 
harnessed to the car of progress.”71 
The Chicago Conference on Trusts was an important 
event in the national discussion of the corporation issue, but 
it was only one of many sources of federal chartering 
proposals. Moreover, despite the efforts of the conference’s 
organizers to achieve political and ideological diversity, the 
conference included few representatives of large corporations 
themselves—one of the most important constituencies in 
debates over corporate reform. Partly for this reason, the 
prevailing theme of the Chicago conference was constraining 
the power of corporations, and the balance of speakers was 
decidedly weighted toward the anti-corporate perspective. 
Concurrently with the Chicago conference, a different 
outlook on federal chartering emerged from another 
important political event. The investigative hearings of the 
U.S. Industrial Commission, spanning 1898–1902, featured 
much greater involvement from the business community, 
including the leaders of several of the nation’s largest 
corporations. Surprisingly, many of these businessmen72 also 
supported federal chartering legislation, though for different 
reasons than the anti-corporate reformers so vocal at the 
Chicago conference. 
 
70  William Wirt Howe, New Orleans Board of Trade, Address to 
Chicago Conference on Trusts (Sept. 16, 1899), in CHICAGO CONFERENCE 
ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, at 623, 624–25. Note, however, that in light of 
the Chicago conference’s ecumenical philosophy, the committee on 
resolutions declined to adopt any official resolutions. See id. at 625–26. 
71  Id. 
72  To the author’s knowledge, all of the businesspeople involved in 
these debates were men. 
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C. The Industrial Commission 
Like the Chicago Conference on Trusts, the U.S. 
Industrial Commission was a response to the dramatic 
economic changes of the era. Unlike the Chicago conference, 
however, which had no formal connection to the federal 
government, the Industrial Commission was a federal body 
created by congressional legislation.73 Its mandate was also 
broader, encompassing not only trusts, but a wide range of 
economic issues. The commission was formed in 1898 to 
“investigate questions pertaining to immigration, to labor, to 
agriculture, to manufacturing, and to business,” and to 
recommend appropriate legislation.74 It was composed of a 
somewhat ungainly roster of nine presidential appointees 
(drawn primarily from business and labor), five sitting U.S. 
senators, and five sitting U.S. representatives. Taking 
inspiration from the British Royal Commissions of the 1890s, 
the Industrial Commission conducted several investigations, 
held numerous hearings, and ultimately issued 19 volumes’ 
worth of official reports. The commission’s work on the 
subject of trusts and industrial combinations included a 
comprehensive survey of state corporation laws,75 a detailed 
study of corporate business and financial practices,76 and 
extensive testimony from corporate managers.77 This 
management testimony is particularly germane, as it reveals 
that while many businessmen favored federal chartering 
legislation, their support had little to do with limiting 
corporate power. 
Unlike anti-corporate reformers who believed state laws 
were too permissive, many witnesses before the Industrial 
 
73  See Act of June 18, 1898, 30 Stat. 476 (1898). 
74  Simon North, The Industrial Commission, 168 N. AM. REV. 708, 709 
(1899). 
75  See generally 2 INDUSTR. COMM’N, TRUSTS AND INDUSTRIAL 
COMBINATIONS (1900). 
76  See generally 13 INDUSTR. COMM’N, TRUSTS AND INDUSTRIAL 
COMBINATIONS (1901). 
77  See generally INDUSTR. COMM’N, PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 
27. 
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Commission believed that state laws were too burdensome. 
Although these “corporatist” reformers also desired federal 
law, their ideal vision of corporate law was more in line with 
that of New Jersey. Notwithstanding the freedom of 
promoters to incorporate in any state of their choosing, the 
antitrust laws of certain states reached all activities within 
their jurisdiction, creating legal risks for corporations 
operating on a national basis. Business leaders hoped that 
national legislation would preempt these troublesome state 
laws, eliminating the danger of legal attack by state 
attorneys general and private plaintiffs. More ambitiously, 
they also hoped that federal legislation would supersede 
federal antitrust law by creating a process through which 
industrial combinations could apply for and receive federal 
regulatory approval. 
The witnesses before the Industrial Commission 
represented many of the country’s largest businesses. 
Perhaps the most notable was Standard Oil, among the most 
powerful—and controversial—of all American industrial 
trusts.78 The commission questioned several members of 
Standard Oil’s senior management on a range of issues 
related to conditions in the oil industry. Although most of 
this questioning focused on the details of Standard Oil’s 
business practices, three Standard Oil witnesses were also 
asked for their views on federal incorporation: John D. 
Rockefeller, the founder of the company; John D. Archbold, 
the company’s de facto chief executive; and Henry H. Rogers, 
another important senior manager. In their responses, each 
of these men supported the prospect of federal incorporation 
as a means of reforming, standardizing, and rationalizing 
corporate law. 
Despite being semi-retired from active management,79 
John D. Rockefeller was questioned on the history and 
structure of the oil industry. Responding to written 
 
78  “Standard Oil” was formally “Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey,” the 
holding company of what had existed as the “Standard Oil Trust” until 
1892. 
79  See DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY & 
POWER 82–84 (2008). 
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interrogatories in late 1899, Rockefeller suggested that the 
federal government encourage the process of industrial 
consolidation. He staunchly defended his company’s 
domination of the oil industry and unequivocally maintained 
that industrial combinations benefited American consumers. 
Although he addressed the specific question of a federal 
corporation law only briefly, his views on the subject could 
not have been clearer—he strongly recommended “federal 
legislation under which corporations may be created and 
regulated.”80 If federal legislation proved impossible, 
Rockefeller recommended uniform state laws as a second-
best alternative. The important point for Rockefeller was 
that corporate reform, whether enacted at the federal or 
state level, be directed toward “encouraging combinations of 
persons and capital,” and “not of a character to hamper 
industries.”81 While he criticized federal antitrust legislation 
as fundamentally misguided, Rockefeller was open to the 
concept of federal regulation and control. As had William 
Howe at the Chicago Conference on Trusts, Rockefeller 
compared industrial combinations to the instrumentality of 
steam power: potentially dangerous if employed 
irresponsibly, but immensely beneficial if properly governed. 
Just as “steam is necessary and can be made comparatively 
safe,” he wrote, “combination is necessary and its abuses can 
be minimized.”82 
John D. Archbold—Standard Oil’s chief executive—took a 
similar position on the subject of federal corporate law.83 
Archbold believed that the natural “next step” in American 
business was “national or federal corporations.”84 According 
to Archbold, “lack of uniformity in the laws of the various 
states, as affecting business corporations, is one of the most 
vexatious features attending the business life of any great 
 
80  INDUSTR. COMM’N, PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 27, at 797. 
81  Id. 
82  Id. 
83  Archbold’s official position was Vice President of Standard Oil Co. 
of New Jersey, but he effectively controlled the entire firm by 1899. See 
YERGIN, supra note 79, at 82–84. 
84  INDUSTR. COMM’N, PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 27, at 565. 
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corporation.”85 Standardizing corporate law would not only 
benefit “great” corporations, but could also encourage new 
competition to enter existing markets. Archbold claimed that 
if a federal corporation law were passed, “any branch of 
business could be freely entered upon by all comers, and the 
talk of monopoly would be forever done away with.”86 
Of the three Standard Oil executives who specifically 
discussed federal chartering, Henry Rodgers—President of 
Standard Oil’s pipeline subsidiary and a key figure within 
the larger firm—addressed the issue in greatest detail. Like 
Rockefeller and Archbold, Rogers favored enactment of a 
single national corporation act. Specifically, Rogers proposed 
a federal law in the model of the English Companies Acts.87 
Rogers found the English law “most desirable in its 
operation,” as it provided management with substantial 
flexibility in organizing and running the business, while at 
the same time providing outside investors with considerable 
information rights.88 Another source of Rogers’s views was 
his negative experiences with the state law system. In 
particular, Rogers hoped that a federal law would reduce the 
amount of antitrust litigation that could be brought in 
multiple states.89 Finally, Rogers was also concerned about 
the economic interests of shareholders, as indicated by his 
strong support for generous information rights. Although he 
believed that attempts by government to “regulate 
speculation” would prove futile, he also believed that 
investors should be entitled to accurate financial 
information.90 In Rogers’s words: “I think we should say to 
 
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
87  English corporate law was set forth in an extended series of 
parliamentary acts, referred to in this Article collectively as the “English 
Companies Acts.” English law had a major influence on liberal state 
corporation acts, most notably that of New Jersey. James B. Dill himself 
stated that the New Jersey corporation act was “largely founded upon the 
English act.” See id. at 1082. 
88  Id. at 585. 
89  See id. 
90  Id. at 586. 
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the public, ‘Here is this property. You can investigate it if 
you want to, and if you are satisfied with the security you 
can put your money into it, and if you are not satisfied with 
the security don’t put the money in.’”91 In this sense, Rogers 
anticipated the regulatory philosophy of the federal 
securities laws, in that he advocated disclosure rather than 
policing the substantive fairness of securities transactions. 
Standard Oil was but one of the corporations represented 
at the commission’s hearings—senior executives of several 
other firms also testified on federal chartering.92 Many of 
these executives shared John D. Rockefeller’s willingness to 
accept federal regulation in the form of corporate law. A 
notable example was John W. Gates, chairman of the 
American Steel and Wire Company. Gates not only 
recommended federal incorporation, but also suggested that 
the federal government take an active role in supervising the 
market. Like many businessmen, Gates viewed federal 
chartering primarily in terms of limiting state law. Under 
his proposal, corporations would be protected from the 
corporate laws of the individual states in exchange for 
“substantial” chartering fees payable to the federal 
government.93 Gates’s proposal extended beyond mere legal 
protection, however. Drawing on his observations of German 
industrial syndicalism, Gates envisioned the federal 
government taking an active role in managing key 
industries—overseeing and subsidizing America’s largest 
corporations. Highly mindful of European competition, Gates 
believed that government stewardship was necessary to 
 
91  Id. 
92  In addition to Standard Oil, the organizations represented at the 
commission’s hearings on trusts and combinations included the American 
Smelting and Refining Company, American Steel and Wire Company, 
American Steel Hoop Company, American Sugar Refining Company, 
American Thread Company, American Tin Plate Company, Distilling 
Company of America, Federal Steel Company, Glucose Refining Company, 
International Silver Company, National Shear Company, National Starch 
Company, National Steel Company, Pittsburg Coal Company, and many 
others. Id. at 1263–64. 
93  Id. at 1022. 
HUTCHISON – FINAL 
1046 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
ensure American dominance in globalizing markets.94 This 
statist vision of industrial policy was unusually ambitious for 
the time, reaching far beyond the more modest suggestions 
of Gates’s fellow witnesses. As discussed in Part III, 
however, the cooperative conception of the government-
business relationship expressed in Gates’ proposals would 
become a major feature of legislative efforts during the 
Theodore Roosevelt Administration. 
Although many additional witnesses—including among 
others Archibald White, President of the National Salt 
Company, Max Pam, general counsel for the American Steel 
and Wire Company, and the pro-business publicist George 
Gunton—also recommended federal chartering, support for 
federalization before the commission was not unanimous. A 
significant minority of witnesses opposed federal chartering. 
William H. Moore, the successful trust promoter,95 believed 
that while American corporate law should emulate the 
English Companies Acts, replacing state with federal 
legislation was both unnecessary and undesirable. According 
to Moore, states with restrictive corporation laws would face 
no choice but to liberalize, or else lose their domestic 
corporations to permissive states such as New Jersey. This 
prediction was similar to that of many anti-corporate 
activists; the difference, of course, being that Moore 
welcomed such a development.96 Similar testimony was 
given by the corporate attorney Francis L. Stetson—a close 
associate of J.P. Morgan and legal counsel to several Morgan 
trusts—who also viewed a national corporation law as 
unnecessary, as well as unconstitutional. In Stetson’s view, 
even if the federal government had constitutional authority 
to control corporations (which he doubted), regulation of 
monopoly was best left to natural economic forces. In terms 
strikingly similar to those of later free-market economists, 
 
94  Id. at 1016–18. 
95  Moore was involved in the creation of United States Steel and 
several other large industrial combinations. See id. at 960–65; JOHN N. 
INGHAM, BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BUSINESS LEADERS, at 
959–60 (1983). 
96 See id. at 994–96. 
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Stetson reasoned that even if a corporation monopolized a 
particular market (Stetson used the specific example of the 
Havemeyer sugar trust), supracompetitive pricing would 
naturally attract new competition, and the problem would 
resolve itself without any need for government 
involvement.97 Finally, John Dos Passos—another prominent 
Wall Street attorney and, incidentally, counsel to the 
Havemeyer sugar trust—also advised a hands-off approach 
to the question of federal corporate law. According to Dos 
Passos, issues of corporate governance were best left to 
private decision making, into which federal legislation would 
only constitute unhelpful interference. Quoting Edmund 
Burke, Dos Passos admonished the federal government to 
avoid involvement in private affairs—be they family, 
business, or otherwise—unless its legal authority was 
unambiguous and the policy necessity was overwhelming.98 
Neither condition was satisfied in his conception of the 
chartering issue. It should be noted that during the 
Progressive Era, in which even members of the business 
community often supported federal regulation, Dos Passos’s 
(as well as Moore’s and Stetson’s) laissez-faire perspective 
was a minority view. Interestingly, this perspective is highly 
resonant with modern corporate legal scholarship, 
illustrating, perhaps, that all things come around again in 
time. 
A final witness worthy of special note is James B. Dill, 
the primary drafter of New Jersey’s permissive corporation 
act. In light of his involvement with the New Jersey statute, 
one might have expected Dill to oppose federal chartering 
legislation. In fact, both in his testimony before the 
Industrial Commission and in his published legal writing, 
Dill was a strong supporter of federal incorporation. The 
reason seems to have been his sincere belief in the liberal 
principles of the English Companies Acts, which he had 
endeavored to incorporate into the New Jersey statute. Dill 
 
97 See id. at 980. Stetson would soon abandon this free-market 
position, however, as he became deeply involved in federalization efforts 
under the Roosevelt Administration. See infra Part III. 
98  INDUSTR. COMM’N, PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 27, at 1162–63. 
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was so convinced of the legal advantages of English law (and, 
by extension, New Jersey law) that he called for its 
implementation on a nationwide basis. During his testimony, 
Dill passionately defended the New Jersey statute, 
emphasizing its requirement that financial information be 
made available to shareholders (a requirement that he 
conceded was not always respected in practice),99 its 
condition that stock be issued only in exchange for cash or 
property,100 and its fair and predictable system of chartering 
fees and taxes.101 In order to secure New Jersey’s advantages 
for all corporations across the country, and to prohibit 
discrimination on the part of more restrictive states, Dill 
recommended that a liberal corporation law be enacted at 
the federal level. According to Dill, federal legislation would 
curb the worst of corporate abuses, while also providing 
every corporation “the right to do as it sees fit” with respect 
to internal governance.102 
Dill’s advocacy of federal chartering was not limited to his 
commission testimony. Three years later, Dill presented a 
more detailed proposal before the Harvard Economics 
Seminary.103 In his Harvard address, Dill set forth his 
outline for a federal incorporation act meant to protect 
corporations from the vagaries of state laws and ensure 
minimum standards of publicity and capitalization. Like 
many commentators, Dill believed that the states were 
incapable of coordinating corporate law: The political and 
financial rewards of attacking successful foreign 
corporations—or, alternatively, of attracting corporations 
with overly permissive corporate laws—were far too great to 
lead to convergence on optimal corporate governance 
standards.104 Dill’s view, of course, was that the New Jersey 
 
99  See id. at 1079. 
100  Id. at 1080–81. This condition prohibited corporations from issuing 
stock in exchange for services. It was actually a fairly restrictive provision, 
even compared to other states at the time. 
101  See id. at 1086–87. 
102  Id. at 1087. 
103  See Dill, supra note 50. 
104  See id. at 278–95. 
HUTCHISON – FINAL 
No. 3:1017]  PROGRESSIVE ERA CONCEPTIONS OF THE CORPORATION 1049 
standard was optimal, and his suggestions for drafting a 
federal law traced the substance of the New Jersey act. 
Specifically, Dill recommended legislation that would, inter 
alia, (1) allow corporations the option of incorporating under 
federal law (without expressly preempting state corporation 
acts), (2) shield federally chartered corporations from state 
lawsuits, regulation, and taxation, and (3) assure 
corporations the privileges and immunities of natural 
persons under the Constitution.105 Unlike anti-corporate 
reformers who sought to limit the power of corporations, Dill 
called upon the federal government to facilitate their 
development. 
As the testimony of these witnesses shows, the speakers 
at the Chicago conference and the witnesses before the 
Industrial Commission shared a common goal of federalizing 
corporate law, but their political motivations were 
fundamentally different. Anti-corporate populists such as 
William Jennings Bryan saw federal legislation as the 
solution to permissive state laws. Representatives of big 
business, such as Rockefeller, Gates, and Dill, saw federal 
legislation as the solution to restrictive state laws. Given 
their very different political perspectives on the nature of the 
corporation—a threat to economic freedom versus the engine 
of economic progress—their hopes for legislation would prove 
mutually incompatible. 
Interestingly, nearly all commentators agreed on one 
specific policy goal: disclosure of corporate financial 
information to the government and/or the public. Among 
anti-corporate reformers, “publicity” was widely viewed as a 
safeguard against monopolistic pricing (though again, the 
mechanism of this protection was rarely explained in detail). 
To these commentators, shareholder protection was 
generally not a major concern, though it was sometimes cited 
as an additional benefit of corporate publicity. It was 
actually corporatist figures, many of whom were corporate 
insiders, who tended to take a greater interest in providing 
information to investors. Even laissez-faire conservatives 
 
105  Id. at 294. 
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who opposed federal legislation entirely (John Dos Passos, 
for example) often supported the general concept of 
mandatory corporate disclosure.106 Why, one might ask, 
would corporate insiders favor disclosure rules? The most 
likely answer is that mandatory disclosure would help 
sound, profitable corporations differentiate themselves in 
financial markets from their lower-quality rivals. Those 
firms able to credibly demonstrate their financial heath 
would enjoy favorable access to securities markets and a 
lower cost of capital. At the turn of the twentieth century, 
the American stock market remained underdeveloped and 
opaque. By reducing the information asymmetries between 
corporations and outside investors, mandatory disclosure 
could provide an advantage to well-governed corporations.107 
Although this reasoning was not expressly articulated by any 
witness before the Industrial Commission, many witnesses 
made disparaging comments regarding unsound, ill-
conceived corporations, reflecting not only the historical 
reality that many corporations were entirely speculative, but 
also the fact that more profitable firms were eager to 
differentiate themselves.108 
In the end, the Industrial Commission itself 
recommended mandatory corporate publicity, even as it 
declined to endorse federal incorporation. In its final report 
to Congress, the commission took a moderate position on 
federal legislation, recommending mandatory disclosure, 
federal corporate taxation, and stronger federal antitrust 
law, but advising against federal incorporation as too radical 
 
106  INDUSTR. COMM’N, PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 27, at 1168–69. 
Francis. L. Stetson and Elbert H. Gary (President of Federal Steel) also 
favored corporate publicity. See Talk for Corporations: Stetson and Gary 
Before the Industrial Commission, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 20, 1899, at 10. 
107  For an analysis of information asymmetry in the early history of 
the American stock market, see BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 53, at 189–
97, 305–11. 
108  For just a few examples of these comments, see, e.g., INDUSTR. 
COMM’N, PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 27, at 68-69, 586, 975–76, 997, 
1070–74, 1154. Even James B. Dill admitted that many corporations were 
formed for purely speculative purposes. Id. at 1079–81. 
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a policy measure.109 According to the commission’s report, 
not only were the practical advantages of federalization 
uncertain, its political implications merited a cautious 
legislative approach.110 Although the commission 
recommended against federalization in the near term, its 
report allowed that, if more conservative measures proved 
ineffective, federal chartering might yet prove necessary at 
some point in the future.111 Indeed, further consideration of 
the chartering issue would not be long in coming—over the 
next decade, the federal incorporation question would play 
an important role in national politics, moving from the realm 
of abstract proposals to specific congressional legislation. But 
as politicians grappled with how best to regulate national 
businesses, the anti-corporate and corporatist perspectives 
would continue to define the debate, ultimately preventing 
any agreement on a federal incorporation law. 
III. FEDERALIZATION EFFORTS DURING THE 
ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION 
The attention brought to the federal chartering issue by 
the Chicago Conference on Trusts and the Industrial 
Commission hearings (both of which were widely covered in 
the national press) led to a number of legislative proposals 
during the first decade of the twentieth century. As early as 
1900, in the immediate wake of the Chicago conference, 
Congress considered the first federal licensing bill, as well as 
a constitutional amendment granting the federal 
government general incorporation powers.112 Although 
additional bills soon followed, chartering legislation did not 
become politically viable until the active involvement of the 
Roosevelt Administration. From the beginning of his 
presidency (following the assassination of William 
 
109  See INDUSTR. COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION 643–52 (1901). 
110  See id. at 645. 
111  See id. 
112  H.R. 5756, 56th Cong. (1st Sess. 1900); H.R.J. Res. 138, 56th Cong. 
(1st Sess. 1900). Neither proposal was successful. 
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McKinley), regulation of big business was a major focus of 
Roosevelt’s Administration, and as the years passed, 
corporate law became increasingly central to his legislative 
agenda. Despite his reputation as a trustbuster, Roosevelt 
was in fact a decidedly “corporatist” progressive, viewing 
large corporations as an essential feature of modern 
economic life, to be attacked by government if and only if 
they abused their economic power. Over the course of his 
presidency, Roosevelt sought a cooperative relationship 
between the government and large corporations, to be 
managed by an empowered federal executive.113 This vision 
was in direct conflict with that of many populist Democrats, 
who feared any concentration of economic power, even (and 
perhaps especially) if controlled by the federal government. 
Thus, the stage was set for continued disagreement over the 
direction of corporate law, as the corporatist agenda of the 
Roosevelt Administration clashed with the populist concerns 
of the Democratic opposition (as well as the “insurgent” wing 
of the Republican party itself). In the end, despite 
Republican control of both houses of Congress for all of 
Roosevelt’s presidency, not one of the federal chartering bills 
proposed during his Administration would pass. 
A. Roosevelt’s Early Approach to Corporations 
While perhaps more conservative than the most 
ambitious reformers of the Progressive Era, Roosevelt was in 
many ways the quintessential progressive, deeply committed 
to social progress and confident in the abilities of 
government. Following his sudden ascension to the 
presidency in September 1901, Roosevelt became the leader, 
not only of the United States, but also of the Republican 
Party’s legislative and regulatory agenda. Motivated by his 
personal belief in the government’s competence to regulate 
the market, encouraged by the pro-regulation views of many 
leading businessmen, and pressured by the antitrust rhetoric 
of his Democratic opponents, Roosevelt embarked on an 
 
113  For a detailed history of the Roosevelt Administration’s 
perspective on corporate regulation, see generally SKLAR, supra note 16. 
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extended effort to establish federal regulation of 
corporations. This effort, which initially focused on publicity, 
would soon lead to the creation of the federal Bureau of 
Corporations, an agency tasked with studying and 
(potentially) supervising interstate corporations. As 
discussed in Section III.B below, the Bureau would reinforce 
Roosevelt’s increasingly ambitious regulatory goals, 
eventually leading to his direct support for federal chartering 
legislation. 
In the early years of his presidency, prior to the creation 
of the Bureau of Corporations, Roosevelt faced strong 
antitrust sentiment from the American public and calls from 
leading Democrats to substantially limit corporate power. 
William Jennings Bryan had been the Democratic 
presidential candidate in 1900, and the Democratic platform 
called for legislation similar to Bryan’s licensing 
proposals.114 Although Bryan lost the election, his calls for 
stricter corporate law retained considerable public appeal, all 
the more so as the Great Merger Movement continued. 
Federal chartering was not just a partisan issue, moreover, 
pro-business publications such as the Wall Street Journal 
strongly favored federal incorporation115 and the 
constitutional amendment effort in 1900 had been led by 
Republicans.116 These pressures, combined with Roosevelt’s 
personal belief in the need for federal business regulation, 
ensured that corporate law would be an important feature of 
his Administration’s agenda. 
In his first message to Congress in December 1901, 
Roosevelt struck a cautious tone on the subject of corporate 
legislation, while at the same time outlining policy proposals 
 
114  Democratic Party Platform of 1900 (July 4, 1900), in AMERICAN 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, eds., 2017), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29587 [perma.cc/G3GY-
K749].   
115  See, e.g., The Needed Reform: A Federal Law for Corporations, 
WALL ST. J., May 23, 1904, at 2; Federal Laws for Corporations, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 12, 1903, at 1; Proposed National Incorporations, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
21, 1903, at 1. 
116  See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
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that would later appear in specific bills. Implicitly criticizing 
populist reformers, Roosevelt warned that attacking the 
trusts would weaken American industry, especially relative 
to the European powers with which the United States was 
increasingly competitive. Roosevelt reserved particular scorn 
for those who opposed all concentrated wealth, proclaiming 
that their broad denouncements of industrial combinations 
“appeal especially to hatred and fear . . . precisely the two 
emotions, particularly when combined with ignorance, which 
unfit men for the exercise of cool and steady judgment.”117 
Rather than destroy large corporations, Roosevelt argued 
that “combination and concentration should be, not 
prohibited, but supervised and within reasonable limits 
controlled.”118 
Roosevelt’s proposals for effecting this control were 
threefold. The first was corporate publicity, a goal with 
broad, bipartisan support. Roosevelt called for the federal 
government to “inspect and examine” corporations—rather 
than requiring corporations to disclose information to the 
public.119 The second proposal addressed the “utter lack of 
uniformity in the State laws” by recommending that the 
federal government “assume power of supervision and 
regulation over all corporations doing an interstate 
business.”120 Roosevelt claimed this would not constitute 
“interfering with the power of the States in the matter 
itself,”121 but this proposal would evolve into more intrusive 
efforts during Roosevelt’s second term. Finally, given the 
increasingly national scope of the economy, Roosevelt 
recommended creation of a cabinet-level Department of 
Commerce and Industries. Although Roosevelt left the exact 
responsibilities of this new department unspecified, its 
 
117  Theodore Roosevelt, First Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1901), in 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, eds., 
2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29542 
[perma.cc/L3ZK-PS96]. 
118  Id. 
119  Id. 
120  Id. 
121  Id. 
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authority would include “all matters affecting the great 
business corporations.”122 
Roosevelt’s perspective—that large corporations were 
socially beneficial if properly regulated by the federal 
government—was compatible with that of many business 
leaders. On the other hand, Roosevelt had little sympathy for 
laissez-faire conservatism. In an address to the Boston 
business community in August 1902, Roosevelt sharpened 
his case for regulation by criticizing those who opposed 
federal action. In his speech, Roosevelt admitted it was often 
difficult to precisely identify corporate evils, but criticized 
wealthy conservatives “who deny that the evils exist.”123 
This criticism ran parallel to the President’s emerging 
distinction between “good” and “bad” trusts—that is, “good” 
trusts cooperated with government regulation, while “bad” 
trusts attempted to oppose it.124 In reality, Roosevelt was 
probably less concerned with any “evils” of corporations than 
with the risk that lack of government action could fuel 
support for socialism.125 Roosevelt thus struck a careful 
balance in denouncing “destructive” or “radical” legislative 
proposals, while at the same time meeting the public’s 
demand for some form of federal control. 
This balance between economic practicality and corporate 
accountability was well received by the American public.126 
Although Roosevelt’s proposals were not immune from 
criticism, few observers fundamentally opposed federal 
 
122  Id. 
123  One Law for All, Says Roosevelt, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 25, 1902, 
at 1. 
124  The upshot of this distinction was that the federal government 
could cooperate with publically-responsible “good” trusts, while legal 
action should be reserved for publically-abusive “bad” trusts. For 
discussion of Roosevelt’s attitudes toward trusts, see KOLKO, supra note 
16, at 127–32. 
125  This concern was a common theme in Roosevelt’s approach to 
business regulation. 
126  See Country Backs Roosevelt in Trust Fight, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 
11, 1901, at 1. 
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supervision.127 Unsurprisingly, populist Democrats such as 
William Jennings Bryan criticized the President for being 
soft on trusts,128 but nearly all concerned accepted the 
inevitability of federal corporate regulation.129 While specific 
questions of scope and emphasis remained subject to debate, 
the broader necessity of federal law was not itself 
controversial. 
In fact, even as the Roosevelt Administration was 
working on its own proposals, the 57th Congress was already 
considering several corporate regulatory bills. In late 1901, 
for example, Representative Charles Littlefield (R-ME) 
introduced legislation that would have imposed extensive 
publicity requirements on newly-formed corporations.130 
Littlefield’s bill found inspiration in both the Chicago 
Conference on Trusts and the Industrial Commission, as well 
as in Roosevelt’s calls for corporate regulation. Littlefield 
endorsed the view, expressed repeatedly at the Chicago 
Conference on Trusts, that publicity was a powerful weapon 
against inflated dividends and monopolistic pricing.131 With 
respect to the Industrial Commission hearings, Littlefield 
cited the testimony of both John D. Rockefeller and James B. 
Dill in support of corporate publicity.132 When the House 
Judiciary Committee reported Littlefield’s bill, the 
committee emphasized that many states had inadequate 
publicity requirements and that remedial action would be 
most effective if taken at the federal level.133 The Democratic 
minority, while also supporting corporate publicity, criticized 
 
127  Cf. Mr. Roosevelt and the Corporations, INDEP., Dec. 17, 1903 
(reporting that Roosevelt’s approach was disfavored by certain 
industrialists as hostile to capital). 
128  See Mr. Cockran Welcomed by Tammany’s Hosts, N.Y. TIMES, July 
5, 1902, at 2; Bryan in Johnson Circus: Nebraskan Speaks in Ohioan’s 
Tent at Toledo, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 14, 1902, at 5; Trusts Called Foes of 
People, CHI. DAILY TRIB., July 19, 1903, at 7. 
129  See, e.g., Joseph Auerbach, President Roosevelt and the Trusts, 175 
N. AM. REV. 877, 878 (1902). 
130  See H.R. 17, 57th Cong. (2d Sess. 1901). 
131  See H.R. REP. NO. 57-3375, pt. 1, at 22–23, 25 (1903). 
132  Id. at 2–6. See also THORELLI, supra note 51, at 538–39. 
133  H.R. REP. NO. 57-3375, pt. 1, at 17–19 (1903).  
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Republicans’ casting it as a panacea for the trust problem. 
The Democrats on the Judiciary Committee called for 
stronger limits on corporate power, including automatic 
bankruptcy proceedings against overcapitalized corporations, 
confiscation of goods shipped in violation of the antitrust 
laws, and, perhaps most importantly, an end to the 
protective tariff.134 Despite their misgivings, however, the 
Democratic minority recommended passage. Ironically, the 
Littlefield bill proved too strict for conservative 
Republicans—the legislation passed the House, but Senate 
Republicans refused to vote on it. 
From the Democratic perspective, Representative Ashton 
C. Shallenberger (D-NE) introduced more ambitious 
legislation in 1901.135 His bill provided for the creation of a 
“Foreign and Internal Commerce Commission,” similar in 
structure to the Interstate Commerce Commission created in 
1887.136 This proposed commission would have had the 
power to grant (and withhold) federal charters.137 The 
commission would enforce the charter system by taxing the 
capital stock of corporations that engaged in interstate 
business without obtaining a federal charter.138 Like the 
Littlefield proposal, Shallenberger’s bill would have also 
imposed disclosure requirements on chartered firms. More so 
than Littlefield, however, Shallenberger was explicit as to 
whom this disclosure was meant to protect, investors not 
being among them. Alleging that dividends on watered stock 
enriched shareholders and increased prices for consumers, 
Shallenberger disclaimed any concern for the economic 
interests of investors. In his view, it was wholly incumbent 
 
134  H.R. REP. NO. 57-3375, pt. 2, at 4–6 (1903). 
135  H.R. 6521, 57th Cong. (1st Sess. 1901). 
136  Id. 
137  Id. § 5. In the bill’s original text, the legal significance of this 
federal charter was unclear. Shallenberger was apologetic regarding the 
imprecisions in his bill, emphasizing that he was “not a lawyer.” Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Trust Legis. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
57th Cong. 17, 24 (1902) [hereinafter Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
Trust Legislation] (statement of Rep. Ashton Shallenberger). 
138  H.R. 6521 § 7. 
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upon investors themselves to investigate securities before 
they purchased them.139 Shallenberger’s bill stalled and died 
in the Republican-controlled House Judiciary Committee, 
but his attitude toward investor protection was common 
among lawmakers at the time. During the early twentieth 
century, corporate disclosure was often viewed as a remedy 
for excessive profits and was, therefore, framed in implicit 
tension with the economic interests of shareholders. 
The Littlefield and Shallenberger bills were 
representative of early chartering proposals. Essentially the 
products of individual Congressmen, they reflected the 
widely-felt need for federal action, but lacked the 
cohesiveness of a broader legislative program. This political 
dynamic changed with the creation of the Bureau of 
Corporations, which used its investigative powers to develop 
a more organized legislative agenda. The Bureau’s 
recommendations—supported by the prestige and authority 
of the President—would take a central role in political 
debates over federal chartering legislation. 
B. The Bureau of Corporations 
The Department of Commerce and Labor, proposed by 
Roosevelt upon taking office, was finally established by 
congressional legislation in February 1903.140 Pursuant to 
discussions between Roosevelt and congressional 
Republicans, the department included within it a specialized 
Bureau of Corporations, tasked with investigating the 
business practices of corporations in interstate commerce.141 
 
139  Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Trust Legislation, supra note 
137, at 22–23 (statement of Rep. Ashton Shallenberger). 
140  An Act to Establish the Department of Commerce and Labor, ch. 
552, 32 Stat. 825 (1903).  Roosevelt’s original proposal had referred to a 
Department of Commerce and Industries, the authority of which would 
include “among many other things whatever concerns labor.” Theodore 
Roosevelt, First Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1901), in AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 
PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, eds., 2017), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29542 [perma.cc/S4HG-
UVC8]. 
141  § 6, 32 Stat. at 828. 
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The Bureau’s mandate reflected the view that publicity was 
central to corporate regulation. Specifically, the Bureau was 
empowered to make “diligent investigation into the 
organization, conduct, and management of the business of 
any corporation, joint stock company or corporate 
combination” and to report its findings to the President for 
the purpose of recommending legislation.142 Consistent with 
the Administration’s evolving regulatory agenda, these 
recommendations would soon include direct federal 
supervision. 
Roosevelt’s own regulatory philosophy—marked by a 
strong belief in executive power—was closely interwoven into 
the very creation of the Bureau. As originally drafted, the 
legislation creating the Bureau defined its publication 
responsibilities broadly, requiring the Bureau to make its 
findings publicly available.143 When the legislation reached 
the conference committee, however, Senator Knute Nelson 
(R-MN), acting at Roosevelt’s behest, introduced an 
amendment requiring the Bureau to report its findings 
directly to the President. The President would then, using 
his executive discretion, determine whether to make such 
information available to the public.144 This change reflected 
three characteristics of Roosevelt’s approach to corporations. 
First, by placing the Bureau’s investigative findings under 
the direct control of the President, it accorded with 
Roosevelt’s expansive view of presidential authority. Second, 
by granting the President the practical option to either act 
on the Bureau’s findings or keep them private (depending on 
the particular firm), it was consistent with Roosevelt’s 
political distinction between “good” and “bad” industrial 
trusts.145 Finally, by preventing the Bureau itself from 
releasing its findings to the public, it underscored the fact 
that disclosure to investors was not one of the 
Administration’s priorities. 
 
142  Id. 
143  THORELLI, supra note 51, at 552. 
144  Id. at 553–54. 
145  See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
HUTCHISON – FINAL 
1060 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
Pursuant to the final version of the act, the Bureau was 
led by a Commissioner of Corporations appointed by (and 
reporting to) the President.146 The Bureau’s first 
Commissioner was James R. Garfield (son of the late 
President James A. Garfield), a friend and advisor to 
President Roosevelt who shared many of his views on 
corporate regulation. Garfield envisioned the Bureau taking 
an active role in investigating corporations, but also believed 
that its central mission was to “cooperate with, not 
antagonize, the business world.”147 During its first year of 
existence, the Bureau embarked on an ambitious research 
program that included a thorough study of state 
legislation.148 The conclusions Garfield drew from this 
study—that differences among state corporation laws 
amounted to legal “anarchy,” that states’ attempts to 
regulate corporations had been “unequal and disastrous,” 
and that state competition to attract corporate charters was 
no less than “thoroughly vicious”—led naturally to 
recommendations for federalizing corporate law.149 
Based on its findings, the Bureau recommended that the 
federal government assume authority over corporations by 
requiring all corporations in interstate commerce to receive 
and maintain a federal license.150 In the Bureau’s 1904 
report, Garfield rejected the possibility that the states could 
reform corporate law themselves, stating that it was 
“obviously impossible that forty-five jurisdictions should 
agree on anything like a uniform system in so important a 
matter.”151 Having dismissed state action, the report 
discussed the possibility of direct federal incorporation. 
Although Garfield believed the federal government could 
constitutionally incorporate firms active in interstate 
 
146 § 6, 32 Stat. at 828. 
147  See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE & LABOR, REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS, H.R. DOC. NO. 58-165, at 36 (3d Sess. 
1904) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS]. 
148  Id. at 16–42. 
149  Id. at 37–40, 46.  
150  Id. at 44–48. 
151  Id. at 44. 
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commerce—and, conversely, could bar firms not so 
incorporated from interstate commerce—he was less 
confident that Congress had power over firms engaged 
purely in manufacturing.152 Thus, while Garfield considered 
federal incorporation a promising method of regulation, he 
worried that it was overly fraught with constitutional 
uncertainties. The approach that Garfield more strongly 
recommended, and that the Administration eventually 
proposed, was the substantively similar option of 
comprehensive federal licensing. 
Although not federal incorporation per se, the Bureau of 
Corporation’s licensing proposal was similar in substance. As 
set forth in the Bureau’s 1904 report, any corporation 
engaged in interstate commerce would be required to 
maintain a federal license. Receipt of this license would be 
conditioned on two requirements: (1) providing the 
government with “reports and returns” regarding business 
and financial information, and (2) satisfaction of “all 
necessary requirements as to corporate organization and 
management.”153 This second condition meant that the 
federal government could dictate corporate governance 
standards, even if state law remained nominally intact. In its 
report, the Bureau proposed that the licensing system leave 
only local matters to the states—e.g., protecting health and 
welfare, adjudicating commercial contracts, and all matters 
concerning real property. Federal control over corporate 
governance was made even more explicit in an appendix, 
which outlined the Bureau’s plans for future legislation in 
detail. In addition to providing “reports and returns,” 
licensed corporations would be required to conform their 
capitalization, management structure, and even commercial 
business practices to federal standards.154 Taken as a whole, 
 
152  REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 147, at 
44–45. Although essentially nonexistent today, the constitutional 
distinction between “commerce” and “intrastate manufacturing” was an 
important (and controversial) issue during the Progressive Era. 
153  Id. at 45. 
154  Id. at 56–60. 
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the Bureau’s licensing proposal was federal incorporation by 
another name. 
Even before the release of the Bureau’s report, Roosevelt 
announced his strong support for the direction of the 
Bureau’s work. Roosevelt argued that in an era of national 
industry, federal legislation was a matter of common sense. 
Free from the political pressures of interstate competition, 
federal law was uniquely capable of transcending the race 
toward “easy terms,” while at the same time avoiding any 
harmful expression of “intemperate, destructive, or 
demagogic spirit.”155 In his praise of “moderation, good 
sense, the earnest desire to avoid doing any damage,” 
Roosevelt’s stance on corporations was consistent with his 
broader economic philosophy156: Concentrated wealth, in and 
of itself, was inevitable in industrial society and should be 
limited by government if and only if it were used to the 
detriment of the general public.157 As Roosevelt saw it, 
“[g]reat corporations are necessary, and only men of great 
and singular mental power can manage such corporations 
successfully, and such men must have great rewards.”158 At 
the same time, however, he also believed that “corporations 
should be managed with due regard to the interest of the 
public as a whole.”159 Without specifically endorsing the 
Bureau’s proposal (which had not yet been published), 
Roosevelt expressed confidence that the Bureau had struck 
the correct political balance, seeking as it did to regulate “by 
co-operation, not antagonism; by making constructive 
legislation, not destructive prosecution.”160 Agreeing with 
Garfield’s position that state law was inadequate, but that 
federal legislation should also be “cooperative” and 
 
155  Theodore Roosevelt, Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1904), in 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, eds., 
2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29545 
[perma.cc/NYS8-DNFD]. 
156  Id. 
157  Id. 
158  Id. 
159  Id. 
160  Id. 
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“constructive,”161 Roosevelt appeared fully prepared to 
support the Bureau’s recommendations. 
Once these recommendations were actually made public, 
however, Roosevelt was slow to commit to any specific 
regulatory structure.162 Although he consistently 
recommended that Congress pass some form of corporate 
law, he tended to emphasize the need for legislation rather 
than its specific details. In his 1905 annual address to 
Congress, Roosevelt stressed that national corporations 
could only be effectively controlled by the national 
government. He urged that legislation be passed “in some 
manner which the wisdom of the Congress may suggest,” 
without addressing the specific form (incorporation, 
licensing, or otherwise) he thought such legislation should 
take.163 Although he criticized “negative” antitrust 
prohibitions and advocated their replacement by 
“affirmative” regulation, Roosevelt was not yet ready to 
propose specific legislation of his own, and seemed to prefer 
further deliberation before committing to any reform 
program.164 
This lack of urgency was partly due to the ongoing 
regulatory activity of the Bureau itself, which had already 
entered into “constructive” agreements with many of the 
nation’s largest trusts.165 Behind the scenes, Garfield had 
entered into investigative relationships with several major 
corporations that were willing to share internal records in 
exchange for deferring stricter antitrust enforcement. These 
informal relationships were suggestive of how a formal 
licensing system would have worked in practice. Between 
 
161  See REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 
147, at 13–14. 
162  The recommendations were published in U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE 
& LABOR, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS (1905). 
163  Theodore Roosevelt, Fifth Annual Message (Dec. 5, 1905), in 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, eds., 
2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29546 
[perma.cc/RH5Q-PAEZ]. 
164  Id. 
165  See KOLKO, supra note 16, at 79–87. 
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1904 and 1906, the Bureau entered into agreements with a 
number of major corporations that allowed it to receive 
access to internal business and financial records. In return, 
the cooperating corporations were protected from antitrust 
enforcement; if the Bureau determined that a disclosing 
corporation was in violation of federal law, it would warn 
management in advance, allowing the firm to alter its 
practices and avoid formal enforcement action.166 The 
Bureau entered into many of these agreements with firms 
controlled by J.P. Morgan & Co., with which the 
Administration had cordial relations and whose companies 
were therefore considered “good” trusts. Only firms that 
failed to cooperate with the Administration were considered 
“bad” trusts. Constructive supervision, rather than legal 
enforcement, was the ideal. As Garfield described the 
Bureau’s activities, a “policy of obtaining heavy cooperation 
rather than arousing the antagonism of business and 
industrial interests has been followed.”167 
One can imagine that a licensing system would have been 
used in similar fashion—as a protective shield for “good” 
trusts and as political leverage against “bad” trusts. In any 
case, though it was already engaged in informal regulation, 
the Bureau remained committed to the enactment of a 
formal licensing system. In his reports of 1905 and 1906, 
Garfield reiterated the need for formal licensing legislation, 
emphasizing the advantages of “preventive rather than 
remedial” law.168 Other members of the Administration 
echoed this emphasis until Roosevelt himself finally 
endorsed licensing in late 1906. In his annual address to 
Congress, Roosevelt affirmed that the time had come for 
federal control over business corporations, and that such 
control be implemented “by a national license law or in other 
 
166  Id. at 74–76; SKLAR, supra note 16, at 187-92; WIEBE, supra note 
15, at 45–47. 
167  See KOLKO, supra note 16, at 75. 
168  See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE & LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS 7–9 (1905); U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE & 
LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS 5–7 
(1906). 
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fashion.”169 Consistent with his broader economic outlook, 
Roosevelt called for preventing the evils of the minority of 
abusive corporations, while protecting the business and legal 
environment for the majority of beneficial corporations. 
Sounding a familiar chord, Roosevelt cast corporate licensing 
as the safest defense against socialism, which he warned 
could be easily inflamed by unchecked corporate excess.170 
Roosevelt chastised business magnates who resisted 
government regulation, proclaiming “it is these reactionaries 
and ultraconservatives who are themselves most potent in 
increasing socialistic feeling.”171 As evidenced by his abiding 
concern for defusing the threat of socialism, Roosevelt saw 
federal regulation as a means of protecting all corporate 
stakeholders, including labor, consumers, and even 
capitalists themselves.172 
Roosevelt’s most forceful call for regulation came in late 
1907, when he argued in support of a major chartering bill 
drafted in part by the Bureau of Corporations.173 Repeating 
themes from earlier addresses, including the “ineffective 
chaos” of state corporate law, Roosevelt laid even stronger 
emphasis on the need for a federal solution.174 Endorsing the 
Bureau’s proposals, the President recommended a licensing 
system combining (1) publicity, (2) securities regulation, and 
(3) a broad prohibition of “unhealthy competition” (including 
price discrimination, predatory pricing, and exclusive 
dealing requirements).175 In keeping with Roosevelt’s 
corporatist outlook, however, combinations and pricing 
 
169  Theodore Roosevelt, Sixth Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1906), in 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, eds., 
2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29547 
[perma.cc/35WB-K6K3]. 
170  Id. 
171  Id. 
172  Id. 
173  This legislation is discussed in detail in Section III.C, infra. 
174  Theodore Roosevelt, Seventh Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1907), in 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, eds., 
2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29548 
[perma.cc/9HEC-2BBZ]. 
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agreements would be permitted, so long as they were 
approved by the federal government.176 
The Administration’s proposals received a wide range of 
political responses. Many of the nation’s major newspapers 
supported federal chartering, as did smaller, more 
specialized publications catering to the business 
community.177 Notably, the editorial board of the Wall Street 
Journal consistently supported the Administration’s plans. 
In several editorials, the Journal argued that federal 
legislation in the form proposed by the President would help, 
not hinder, American corporations.178 Many anti-corporate 
political figures, including William Jennings Bryan, agreed 
with this assessment. They considered it an argument 
against the President’s proposals, however, given their 
distrust of corporate power.179 From yet another perspective, 
many corporatist reformers who supported federal 
chartering nonetheless found the Administration’s proposals 
overly restrictive. For example, James B. Dill, who continued 
 
176  Id. 
177  See, e.g., Opinion, Corporation Oversight, N.Y. TRIB., Dec. 22, 1904, 
at 6; Opinion, Mr. Garfield and the Corporations, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 24, 
1904 (aggregating other newspapers’ opinions on federal corporate 
legislation); Opinion, Conservative, Not Radical, DULUTH NEWS-TRIB., Jan. 
8, 1905; John C. Richberg, Opinion, Need of a National Incorporation Law, 
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 30, 1906, at B5; Opinion, Shortsighted Leaders, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 27, 1907, § 2, at 4; Opinion, Federal Corporations, PLAIN 
DEALER, June 3, 1908 (summarizing business support for federal 
incorporation); Opinion, Federal Incorporation, OHIO STATE J., June 16, 
1908.  
178  See, e.g., Opinion, Federal Incorporations, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 
1904, at 1; Opinion, Federal Incorporations or Licenses, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
22, 1904, at 1; National Regulation of Corporations, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 
1905, at 1; Opinion, The Nation and the States, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1907, 
at 1; Opinion, Federal Incorporations, WALL ST. J., May 28, 1908.  
179  Bryan (who was preparing to run for President in 1908) emerged 
as a major critic of the Administration’s proposals, which he warned would 
emasculate vigorous state regulations. This position was somewhat ironic 
given that Bryan had long supported federal licensing. See Opinion, 
Attacks Idea of President, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1907, at 12; Opinion, Bryan 
Opposed to Roosevelt’s Plan, BALTIMORE AM., Oct. 11, 1907; Opinion, Bryan 
the Star at Peoria Show, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 10, 1908, at 4. 
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to support federal incorporation, felt that the 
Administration’s proposals would place undue burdens on 
national firms. Dill preferred that federal chartering be 
optional for corporations, allowing them to remain under 
permissive state statutes (such as that of New Jersey) if they 
chose.180 Finally, a minority of conservative commentators 
opposed federal legislation entirely. The editorial board of 
the New York Times, one of the most conservative major 
newspapers of the era, consistently represented this 
position.181 
Each of these perspectives would play a role in the 
looming battle over federal chartering, a political conflict 
which would reach its height in the final years of the 
Roosevelt presidency. As Roosevelt pushed for federal 
legislation near the end of his second term, he faced an ironic 
political situation: Nearly all major political interests 
supported federal chartering, but disagreed as to the 
fundamental goals that chartering legislation was meant to 
accomplish. Anti-corporate reformers, represented by Bryan 
Democrats, sought to strictly constrain all large corporations 
and therefore distrusted the Administration’s plans for 
supervising (and protecting) “good” trusts. Corporatist 
reformers, for their part, sought to empower corporations, 
but were also beginning to grow suspicious of Roosevelt’s 
ambitious regulatory agenda. As the Administration tried to 
shepherd corporate legislation through Congress, Roosevelt 
would eventually alienate both sides. Even though his own 
approach sought to empower large corporations, his 
increasingly interventionist stance alarmed conservatives as 
well as Democrats. In the end, the Administration would fail 
 
180  Opinion, For Federal Franchise, but Optional—J. B. Dill, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 23, 1904, at 5; Opinion, SPRINGFIELD DAILY REPUBLICAN 
(Springfield, Mass.), Dec. 24, 1904, at 6; Opinion, Dill on the Garfield 
Report: His View of Federal Franchises, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 1904, at 2. 
Dill moderated his opposition to the Administration’s proposals after 
becoming a judge of the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals in 1905. 
181  See, e.g., Opinion, State or Federal Control?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 
1904, at 6; Opinion, Groping for Remedies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1907, at 6; 
Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1907, at 8. 
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to navigate the political hazards in Congress and would run 
aground between the anti-corporate and corporatist reform 
positions. 
C. The Hepburn Bill 
Late in Roosevelt’s second term, as the President and the 
Bureau of Corporations pressed the case for federal 
chartering, several licensing, registration, and incorporation 
bills were introduced in Congress. The most important of 
these proposals—supported by much of the business reform 
community—was the so-called “Hepburn Bill,” which was 
drafted by the Roosevelt Administration in close cooperation 
with business interests and introduced in Congress by 
Administration-ally Representative William Hepburn (R-IA). 
Among the many federal chartering bills introduced during 
this period, the Hepburn Bill initially appeared the most 
likely to become law. Once in Congress, however, the bill 
foundered in the committee process, as the various interests 
supporting the legislation divided over its core provisions. 
Representing the Progressive Era’s most serious attempt at 
chartering legislation, the history of the bill provides a 
telling example of the difficulties of corporate reform. 
As the Administration was intensifying calls for corporate 
legislation, private interests were also exploring the 
potential advantages of federal law. In October 1907, the 
National Civic Federation (the “NCF”) held a “National 
Conference on Trusts and Combinations” to develop private 
opinion on government responses to the trust issue.182 The 
NCF was the organizational successor to the Civic 
Federation of Chicago, and at the National Conference on 
Trusts and Combinations (also held in Chicago) it 
consciously revisited the issues addressed at the Chicago 
Conference on Trusts in 1899. Since the original conference 
had never issued an official policy position, and new 
momentum for corporate legislation seemed to be building in 
Washington, the second conference was seen as an 
 
182  See PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS AND 
COMBINATIONS (Nat’l Civic Fed’n ed., 1908) (hereinafter PROCEEDINGS). 
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opportunity for businesses to express their policy views to 
hopefully influence the substantive content of any 
forthcoming legislation. Like the first conference, most 
participants at the second conference advocated corporate 
regulatory reform, with many recommending some form of 
direct federal chartering. This time, however, the 
recommendations leaned toward the corporatist perspective, 
due to a narrower curation of political views on the part of 
the NCF. Hoping to avoid the inconclusive outcome of the 
1899 conference, the NCF leadership abandoned the goal of 
ideological diversity and instead ensured that most invitees 
generally supported pro-business regulation.183 Due in part 
to this ideological cohesiveness, the Chicago conference had a 
significant influence on the Roosevelt Administration’s 
policymaking efforts: Following the conference, the NCF 
would become directly involved in the legislative drafting 
process, and positions expressed during the conference 
proceedings would be incorporated into the bill itself.184 
Although the conference was marked by broad support for 
federal legislation, the specific form such legislation should 
take remained subject to dispute. Federal chartering—
whether licensing or incorporation—was specifically called 
for by several conferees, but different speakers had different 
conceptions of what federal chartering would specifically 
accomplish. Representative Henry W. Palmer (R-PA), who 
spoke at the Chicago conference in support of optional 
federal incorporation, exemplified the corporatist view. 
Although Palmer did not call for the preemption of state law, 
he believed that if a federal alternative became available, 
most firms would choose federal law to avoid the 
“limitations, exactions, and annoyances imposed on them by 
the states.”185 Approvingly citing the English Companies 
Acts, Palmer maintained that “proper regulation and 
 
183  SKLAR, supra note 16, at 208-09. 
184  See infra notes 197–204 and accompanying text. 
185  Representative Henry W. Palmer, Federal Incorporation, Address 
to the National Conference on Trusts and Combinations (Oct. 24, 1907), in 
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 182, at 351, 361. 
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control” should entail no hostility to honest business.186 The 
investment banker Edwin Seligman (brother to the famous 
public finance economist, Edwin R. A. Seligman) took a 
similar view. Federal incorporation, he maintained, would be 
“desirable in the interests of the corporations themselves.”187 
Seligman believed that a federal statute would “protect such 
companies as remain within the law and would defend them 
from harassment by forty-five separate legislatures.”188 
Finally, the Administration’s views were represented by 
Herbert Knox Smith, who had recently succeeded Garfield as 
Commissioner of Corporations.189 Smith argued that federal 
legislation would solve the many problems of the state-law 
system, which was “a chaos of conflicting legal conditions 
resulting in inefficiency and uncertainty.”190 According to 
Smith, a centralized body of uniform law would facilitate 
industrial cooperation, allowing business and government to 
work together to further national prosperity.191 
Not everyone at the conference shared Smith’s optimistic 
vision, however. Certain conference participants, while not 
actively hostile to corporations, were less sanguine as to the 
policy benefits of protecting them under federal law. Wade 
Ellis, the Attorney General of Ohio (one of the stricter 
 
186  Id. at 361–62. Palmer’s position was similar to that of James B. 
Dill.  
187  Edwin Seligman, The Trust Problem, Address to the National 
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corporate law jurisdictions), called for Congress to impose 
minimum standards on interstate corporations. Absent such 
standards, Ellis predicted a race to the bottom among 
chartermongering states. His primary grievance was 
intercorporate stockholding—freely allowed by New Jersey—
which Ellis believed should be universally prohibited by the 
federal government.192 Bartlett Tripp, a prominent attorney 
from South Dakota, also argued that federal law should 
bring corporations under stricter control. Although he 
conceded the inevitability of large combinations of capital 
(“[t]he little red shop around the corner has gone out of 
business forever”), Tripp believed that existing laws placed 
inadequate limits on corporate power.193 He warned, “The 
means that have brought us wealth and the luxuries of life 
[i.e., corporations] must not become instruments of 
oppression and tyranny.”194 One of the few judges at the 
conference, Judge Peter Grosscup of the Seventh Circuit 
struck a populist note in his convention comments. Arguing 
for federal regulation, Grosscup claimed that several state 
governments allowed the formation of corporations without 
any oversight whatsoever: “Put your nickel in the slot and 
take out a charter,” as he described the incorporation 
process.195 
 
192  Wade H. Ellis, Attorney Gen. of Ohio, Present Principles 
Enunciated by the New Organization of Attorneys-General, Address to the 
National Conference on Trusts and Combinations (Oct. 22, 1907), in 
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 182, at 41. 
193  Bartlett Tripp, Powers of the State and Nation over Corporations 
and Trusts, Address to the National Conference on Trusts and 
Combinations (Oct. 22, 1907), in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 182, at 128, 
136–38. 
194  Id. at 137.  
195  Peter S. Grosscup, Judge, U.S. Circuit Court, Anti-Trust Laws, 
Address to the National Conference on Trusts and Combinations (Oct. 23, 
1907), in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 182, at 221, 227. Ironically, Grosscup 
was well known as a pro-business judicial figure, having issued several 
injunctions against striking labor unions, most notably during the 
Pullman strike. Richard Hofstadter describes Grosscup as a jurist of 
“impeccable conservatism.” See HOFSTADTER, supra note 15, at 222–24. 
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Notwithstanding the occasional instance of anti-corporate 
populism, the majority of participants at the Chicago 
conference expressed relatively corporatist views. This loose 
consensus was reflected in the conference’s formal 
resolutions, which went further in recommending federal 
legislation than the noncommittal resolutions of 1899. Even 
the 1907 resolutions were relatively cautious, however, being 
limited to the creation of a federal commission to study and 
recommend corporate reform. Specifically, the resolutions 
advised Congress to consider, by way of a federal 
commission: (1) allowing railroads to cooperatively agree on 
“reasonable” freight and passenger rates (subject to approval 
from the Interstate Commerce Commission); (2) removing 
labor unions and agricultural collectives from the 
prohibitions of the Sherman Act; (3) removing business 
combinations and industrial agreements “in the public 
interest” from the prohibitions of the Sherman Act; (4) 
enacting a corporate licensing or direct incorporation law; 
and (5) requiring corporate disclosure to the Department of 
Commerce and Labor.196 
Despite the conference’s recommendation that these 
issues be studied by a government commission, key figures 
within the NCF sought to bypass this intermediate step and 
push for federal legislation immediately. Given the 
(seemingly) broad consensus at the conference and the 
supportive attitude of the Roosevelt Administration, NCF 
leaders believed the time was right for the passage of a 
federal chartering law. Seth Low and Ralph Easely, the 
NCF’s president and founder, respectively, sought to push 
forward an activist version of the conference’s resolutions.197 
In cooperation with Herbert Knox Smith of the Bureau of 
Corporations (who had spoken at the conference himself), 
Low, Easley, and other NCF members began preliminary 
work on a chartering bill. The timing seemed fortuitous—
congressional Republicans had indicated their support and 
several major industrialists had signaled their receptiveness 
 
196  PROCEEDINGS, supra note 182, at 453–56. 
197  See SKLAR, supra note 16, at 228-29. 
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to the President. In early 1908, drafting work began in 
earnest on what would become the Hepburn Bill.198 
The drafting process soon became a highly collaborative 
effort, which included a range of representatives from 
business, government, and organized labor. Key contributors 
included business figures with strong corporatist 
sensibilities. Most notably, J.P. Morgan associates George W. 
Perkins, Francis L. Stetson, and Victor Morawetz were all 
closely involved in the drafting process. Other 
representatives of big business who consulted on the bill 
included Elbert H. Gary, Edgar Addison Bancroft, August 
Belmont, Isaac Seligman, and James Speyer (all members of 
the NCF and supporters of federal chartering).199 Gary and 
Bancroft were also key figures in the J.P. Morgan financial 
empire, further strengthening J.P. Morgan’s influence on the 
Hepburn Bill.200 National labor leaders including Samuel 
Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor 
(the “AFL”), also played an important role. Moderate labor 
interests such as the AFL strongly supported federal 
chartering. They were particularly enthusiastic regarding 
the NCF’s recommendation that labor unions be excluded 
from the antitrust laws.201 
Early drafts of the bill were structured as amendments to 
the Sherman Act, adding a comprehensive system of 
registration and publicity. Corporations could register with 
the Bureau of Corporations by providing detailed 
information regarding their business and financial structure. 
Once registered, corporations would then be able to 
“preclear” mergers, combinations, and other strategic 
transactions by filing the relevant transaction documents 
with the Bureau in advance. Corporations that chose not to 
 
198  Id.  
199  Id. 
200  Gary was the president and chairman of United States Steel, 
while Bancroft was counsel to International Harvester. Belmont, 
Seligman, and Speyer were each prominent New York bankers. See 
generally SKLAR, supra note 16, at 179-332 for a thorough discussion of 
antitrust reform efforts and the key actors involved. 
201  KOLKO, supra note 16, at 133–38; SKLAR, supra note 16, at 228-29.  
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register were not prohibited from engaging in combinations, 
but would continue to run the risk of Sherman Act 
prosecution. This system would provide the federal 
government with oversight over industrial combinations 
while also providing national businesses one of their most 
sought-after policy goals: eliminating the legal risk of 
antitrust prosecution by obtaining regulatory clearance 
before consummating major transactions. Essentially, rather 
than using the Sherman Act as an ex post enforcement 
mechanism, this system would give the federal government 
the power of prophylactic supervision. For their part, labor 
unions would be granted even stronger protection under the 
bill, allowing them to escape the Sherman Act entirely by 
making specified organizational disclosures. Under this 
proposed framework, the Administration, big business, and 
organized labor each seemed to be getting what they 
wanted.202 
Soon, however, the influence of Francis L. Stetson and 
Victor Morawetz—both Morgan-associated corporate 
attorneys—began to push the bill in an even more pro-
business direction. In late February 1908, Stetson and 
Morawetz submitted a revised draft limiting Sherman Act 
prosecution to “unfair” and “unreasonable” agreements and 
combinations, even for corporations that chose not to register 
with the Bureau of Corporations.203 This change would have 
significantly weakened the Sherman Act, which contained no 
exception for “reasonable” restraints of trade. The 
Administration rejected Stetson and Morawetz’s proposal, 
which would have undermined the government’s supervisory 
authority. Still, the bill underwent several revisions as the 
Morgan interests pressed for advantage. Eventually, 
Roosevelt himself became personally involved and wrenched 
the bill back to his own regulatory preferences. Central to 
Roosevelt’s vision was a strong oversight role for the federal 
government, including the assertion of executive authority 
 
202  SKLAR, supra note 16, at 231–33; KOLKO, supra note 16, at 134; 
WIEBE, BUSINESSMEN AND REFORM, supra note 15, at 80–81. 
203  SKLAR, supra note 16, at 233-34. 
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over the private decision making of corporations. Roosevelt 
added stricter registration requirements and an expanded, 
quasi-managerial role for the federal government. The bill 
was finalized in March and sent to Representative Hepburn, 
who introduced it in Congress in early 1908 as the Hepburn 
amendments to the Sherman Act.204 Although the 
Administration was surprisingly reserved in its endorsement 
of the final bill (Roosevelt described it to Congress as a 
tentative suggestion), political support appeared strong.205 
Once in Congress, however, the bill attracted serious 
criticism. Much of the controversy centered around the bill’s 
favorable treatment of labor unions. Although large 
corporations were willing to accommodate unions to secure 
their political support, smaller businesses reacted extremely 
negatively to the protection of unions from the antitrust 
laws. The National Association of Manufacturers (“NAM”), 
representing a broad cross-section of American business, 
strongly opposed the bill, as did dozens of smaller 
commercial and trade associations.206 Although the NAM 
was supportive of the general concept of federal chartering, it 
refused to accept any legislation that would strengthen the 
position of labor unions. This opposition was hardly 
surprising, as the NAM was a deeply anti-labor 
organization,207 yet its intensity seemed to catch the NCF 
leadership off guard. 
Anti-labor opposition was strengthened by many 
businesses’ worry that the government was aiding dominant 
trusts at the expense of small and medium-sized enterprises. 
The National Council of Industrial Defense, an umbrella 
 
204  H.R. 19745, 60th Cong. (1908).  
205  SKLAR, supra note 16, at 239.  
206  Many of these associations were represented before Congress by 
the attorney and lobbyist James A. Emery. See An Act to Regulate 
Commerce: Hearings on House Bill 19745 Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 60th Cong. 470–95, 663–93, 740–47 (1908) [hereinafter 
Hearings on H.R. 19745]. The Hepburn Bill hearings also included more 
than 100 letters and telegrams from individual firms and regional trade 
associations, the majority of which expressed vociferous opposition to 
favorable treatment of labor unions. See id. at 8–9, 432–70.  
207  SKLAR, supra note 16, at 225–26. 
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group of 130 commercial associations (led by the NAM), 
voiced this concern to Administration officials directly, 
stating that powerful unions and powerful trusts would 
unfairly benefit from the legislation.208 From the opposite 
end of the political spectrum, anti-corporate and pro-labor 
interests also criticized the bill. The American Antitrust 
League, for example, supported the protection of labor 
unions, but feared that the bill provided large corporations 
with undue latitude to merge and consolidate.209 Finally, 
even corporatist reformers involved in drafting the 
legislation had misgivings over the direction in which 
Roosevelt had taken the bill. Corporate lawyers such as 
Stetson and Morawetz, who had hoped for protective 
legislation, now faced a much more expansive system of 
federal supervision and control.210 
In just a few short weeks, support for the bill unraveled. 
As soon as Roosevelt realized that his preferred version was 
unlikely to pass, he abandoned any serious efforts to promote 
the legislation in Congress. Although Roosevelt continued to 
call for congressional action, he spent little political capital 
supporting corporate legislation that lacked what he 
considered its most important feature—executive power to 
approve or disapprove corporate combinations and horizontal 
agreements.211 Seth Low and other NCF leaders tried to 
persuade Roosevelt to strengthen his support, but the 
President drew increasingly disengaged.212 Without 
Roosevelt’s active backing, and amidst growing criticism 
from across the political spectrum, the Hepburn Bill stalled 
in the House Judiciary Committee by late spring. 
 
208  See id. at 266–67.  
209  See Hearings on H.R. 19745, supra note 206, at 336-64. 
210  See SKLAR, supra note 16, at 235–53. 
211  See Theodore Roosevelt, Special Message to Congress on Labor 
(Mar. 25, 1908), in AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John 
T. Woolley, eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php 
?pid=69676 [perma.cc/29H7-L95K]. 
212  See KOLKO, supra note 16, at 136–38; SKLAR, supra note 16, at 
274–76. 
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The legislation fared even worse in the Senate, where it 
was expressly rejected in January 1909 by the Senate 
Judiciary Committee.213 The Committee refused to allow the 
executive branch to make unilateral exceptions to the 
Sherman Act. Not shying away from dramatic rhetoric, the 
Committee report compared the presidential powers granted 
under the bill to the dispensing prerogative of James II at 
the time of the Glorious Revolution. According to the 
Committee, the bill would allow the executive to punish or 
excuse legal violations “without notice or hearing and wholly 
ex parte—a course of procedure that would not be tolerated 
in any court of our country.”214 The Committee broadly 
opposed any weakening of the Sherman Act, which the bill 
would “emasculate,” “undermine,” and render “nugatory as a 
remedial statute.”215 In the Senate Judiciary Committee, at 
least, anti-corporate sentiment remained strong. 
The Hepburn Bill was the Roosevelt Administration’s 
final attempt at corporate legislation, and its defeat 
represented the broader failure of Roosevelt’s vision of 
corporate reform. Despite the support for federal chartering 
throughout Roosevelt’s presidency, the political consensus 
needed to pass concrete legislation proved illusory. In a 
sense, Roosevelt’s proposals included ideological aspects of 
both the corporatist and anti-corporate perspectives: his 
administration sought close cooperation between government 
and big business but also insisted that corporate decision 
making be subject to executive authority. Rather than 
achieving compromise, Roosevelt alienated both camps. Anti-
corporate traditionalists, who valued the Sherman Act in its 
original form, mistrusted any proposal to selectively 
facilitate anticompetitive behavior. On the other hand, many 
corporatists became increasingly uncomfortable with 
Roosevelt’s regulatory proposals, which appeared to reach 
considerably beyond their preferred level of government 
control. Finally, favorable treatment of labor unions—
 
213  See S. REP. NO. 60-848 (1909). 
214  Id. at 9. 
215  Id. at 11. 
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included to secure the support of the AFL—probably did 
more than anything to ensure the failure of the Hepburn 
Bill. While it is tempting to conclude that Roosevelt’s 
political approach undermined the Hepburn Bill, the 
succeeding administration proved no more successful in 
passing similar legislation. As the experience of the Taft 
Administration shows, disagreement over the purpose of 
corporate reform was an insurmountable obstacle. 
IV. FEDERALIZATION EFFORTS DURING THE 
TAFT ADMINISTRATION 
The end of Roosevelt’s presidency was not the end of the 
federal chartering movement. Although the Hepburn Bill 
had failed, proponents of federal chartering had much to 
hope for in the Taft Administration. As Roosevelt’s political 
protégé and hand-picked successor, Taft shared Roosevelt’s 
views regarding the economic necessity of large corporations 
and the importance of preventing them from abusing their 
economic power. Many observers considered Taft even more 
business-friendly than Roosevelt, giving optimism to large 
corporations lobbying for protective regulation. Once in 
office, however, Taft disappointed such expectations. 
Although Taft supported federal chartering, his views on 
corporate regulation proved more market-oriented than his 
predecessor’s. Most notably, he was less inclined to favor the 
legal protections sought after by big business.216 Taft found 
himself in an awkward position between anti-corporate and 
corporatist reformers, unable to build significant support for 
his preferred (mildly corporatist) chartering legislation. Taft 
did succeed, however, in enacting a corporation “excise” tax, 
which included certain regulatory features that had long 
been called for in chartering debates. In the context of 
 
216  See SKLAR, supra note 16, at 364–81. To this day (and despite the 
best efforts of historians), the popular image of Roosevelt is that of the 
aggressive trust buster. Taft, on the other hand, is often considered more 
conservative. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 15, at 236–54. As discussed 
herein, these popular conceptions of Roosevelt and Taft are inaccurate in 
important respects. 
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repeated failure to pass a federal chartering bill, this tax 
satisfied some of the demand for federal action toward 
corporations and partially relieved the political pressure for 
more comprehensive legislation. 
A. Corporatist Proposals 
Upon taking office in March 1909, Taft appeared likely to 
continue the agenda of the Roosevelt Administration. Like 
his mentor, Taft believed that large corporations were 
inevitable in modern society and that federal law should 
concern itself with actual economic abuses, not corporate size 
per se. Unlike Roosevelt, however, Taft was not a proponent 
of executive discretion and rejected the use of informal 
relationships as a basis for distinguishing between “good” 
and “bad” trusts. A jurist above all else, Taft was deeply 
committed to the rule of law and strove for consistent 
enforcement of existing antitrust prohibitions.217 Although 
he supported federal chartering throughout his 
administration, Taft invested greater effort in prosecuting 
trusts under the Sherman Act. Partly for this reason, he had 
little success in promoting chartering legislation in Congress. 
Notwithstanding the failure of the Hepburn Bill, the 1908 
presidential election had primed Washington for further 
regulatory proposals. The Democratic platform of 1908 called 
for federal licensing of any corporation controlling “as much 
 
217  Taft’s antitrust perspective—his belief in the jurisprudential 
wisdom of allowing reasonable restraints of trade, coupled with his strong 
commitment to impartial enforcement of the law—derived directly from 
his experience as a federal judge for the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
where he was considered a leading expert on antitrust law. His decision in 
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) 
holding that ancillary restraints of trade should be subject to a 
reasonableness standard was later adopted by the Supreme Court. This 
“rule of reason” is today considered one of the most important 
developments in antitrust law. See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason 
and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 
775, 801 (1965). 
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as twenty-five percent of the product in which it deals.”218 
Although less specific, the Republican platform also called 
for the regulation of large corporations, recommending that 
the government enforce “greater supervision and control 
over, and secure greater publicity in, the management of 
that class of corporations” active in interstate commerce.219 
Underscoring the bipartisan support for corporate reform, 
Taft referenced both platforms favorably during his 
campaign and called for legislation “inducing or compelling” 
large corporations to submit “to registry and to proper 
publicity regulations and supervision of the Department of 
Commerce and Labor.”220 
The first year of Taft’s presidency showed little progress 
on the chartering front, however, as the Administration 
focused its efforts on enacting a corporate income tax.221 In 
early 1910, once the corporation tax had been enacted, Taft 
formally proposed an incorporation law covering all firms 
engaged in interstate commerce capitalized at $100,000 or 
more.222 This proposal, which was introduced in Congress as 
the “Clark-Parker bills,”223 would have subjected large 
corporations to structural and operational constraints, but 
 
218  Democratic Party Platform of 1908 (July 7, 1908), in AMERICAN 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, eds., 2017), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29589 [perma.cc/p3qn-8rmp].  
219  Republican Party Platform of 1908 (June 16, 1908), in AMERICAN 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, eds., 2017), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29632 [perma.cc/g3aw-6mqf]. 
220  William H. Taft, Address Accepting the Republican Presidential 
Nomination (July 28, 1908), in AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard 
Peters & John T. Woolley, eds., 2017), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=76222 [perma.cc/ezm5-
vf7l].  
221  See infra Section IV.C. 
222  Urofsky, supra note 16, at 180–81. 
223  The Clark-Parker bills were named after Administration allies 
who sponsored the legislation: Senator Clarence Clark (R-WY), who 
introduced a bill in the Senate, S. 6186, 61st Cong. (1910), and 
Representative Richard Wayne Parker (R-NJ), who introduced the same 
bill in the House, H.R. 20142, 61st Cong. (1910). As discussed below, 
Parker’s support was particularly notable, as he represented the state of 
New Jersey. 
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would also have protected corporations from state and 
federal antitrust laws. Taft heralded the proposal as 
beneficial both to individual corporations and the broader 
economy, emphasizing the economic benefits of industrial 
consolidation.224 Business interests praised the proposal and 
the legal certainty that it offered.225 The measure was 
opposed by the insurgent wing of the President’s own party, 
who wanted a stricter, more punitive approach to corporate 
regulation.226 Allying themselves with anti-corporate 
Democrats, these insurgent Republicans demanded an 
amendment allowing the government to revoke federal 
charters, which would have provided a means of punishing 
corporations that acted against the public interest.227 A 
revocation provision was unacceptable to the corporatist 
reformers supporting the bill, as it undermined the very 
legal certainty that business interests most desired.228 The 
legislation was thus condemned to yet another congressional 
stalemate, in which Taft could do little to effectively 
intervene. 
The failure of the Clark-Parker bills speaks to the 
awkward position of the Taft Administration, which had 
managed to offend both business conservatives and 
economically progressive Republicans. The history of the 
bills also highlights an intriguing feature of the political 
environment, however: the lack of organized political 
resistance to federal legislation from New Jersey. Given the 
 
224  See William H. Taft, Special Message (Jan. 7, 1910), in AMERICAN 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, eds., 2017), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=68486 [perma.cc/3p5t-
agxm]. 
225  Topics in Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1910, at 13. 
226  In the politics of the era, “insurgent” Republicans were a large 
element within the Republican Party who advocated a distinctly 
progressive social, political, and economic agenda. 
227  Hard Fight Ahead on Taft Trust Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1910, at 
1; Has Repeal Clause: Federal Incorporation Bill Strengthened, N.Y. TRIB., 
Jan. 22, 1910, at 1; Taft’s Trust Bill Put in Final Form, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
28, 1910, at 5. 
228  Incorporation Bill Will Not Be Pushed, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1910, 
at 1. 
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state’s financial interest in attracting and maintaining 
corporate charters, one might have expected active 
opposition from New Jersey political figures. By displacing 
state corporate law—or by superimposing stricter national 
standards—federal legislation would have undermined the 
advantages of incorporating in New Jersey. Given the state’s 
fiscal policies and the importance of corporate tax revenues, 
New Jersey politicians had strong incentives to oppose 
legislation at the federal level. Surprisingly, however, there 
is no evidence of such opposition either in congressional 
discussions or in journalistic coverage at the time. On the 
contrary, Richard Parker, a long-serving Representative 
from New Jersey, not only chaired the House Judiciary 
Committee that oversaw the Clark-Parker bills, but 
personally sponsored the legislation in cooperation with the 
President, which strongly suggests that at least some New 
Jersey politicians were motivated by non-parochial interests. 
This suggestion is strengthened by the political 
circumstances in which New Jersey lost its chartering crown 
to Delaware—when the New Jersey legislature suddenly 
passed several strict antitrust provisions in 1913.229 These 
actions seem puzzling: Why did New Jersey political figures 
fail to protect the state’s golden goose? The complacency of 
New Jersey politicians in the face of threats to the state’s 
chartering leadership may have reflected the decreasing 
importance of franchise taxes to the state’s budget.230 
According to the economic historian Christopher Grandy, a 
developing industrial economy and rapidly increasing 
population meant that corporate taxes were shrinking as a 
portion of New Jersey’s total budget, particularly as the state 
funded infrastructure spending with inheritance, property, 
and railroad taxes.231 As the state became less reliant on 
 
229  These provisions, known as the “seven sisters,” had been 
advocated by outgoing governor Woodrow Wilson—a political figure with a 
distinctly national (rather than local) political agenda. The immediate 
result of these provisions was to drive corporations to relocate in 
Delaware. See Grandy, supra note 42, at 688–91. 
230  Id. at 685, 689. 
231  Id. at 689–91. 
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corporation revenues, legislators became more amenable to 
Wilsonian progressivism.232 
Following the failure of the Clark-Parker bills, Taft 
continued to call for federal legislation, but his efforts are 
best described as dutiful, rather than enthusiastic. 
Comprising only two sentences, his request for a federal 
chartering act in his second annual address to Congress was 
perfunctory at best, seeming to acknowledge the unlikelihood 
of successful congressional action. Reminding Congress that 
he had previously recommended legislation, Taft merely 
stated, “I renew my recommendation in that behalf.”233  
Although the President himself seemed to have lost 
interest, large corporations and their political allies 
continued to lobby for corporatist legislation. These lobbying 
efforts remained intensive throughout the Taft 
Administration, eventually leading to further consideration 
of the chartering issue in Congress. The most notable 
lobbying efforts were led by the NCF, which conducted a 
survey of over 16,000 “representative Americans” (actually 
weighted toward businesspeople and other professionals) 
whom the NCF claimed overwhelmingly supported federal 
incorporation.234 In 1911, the Senate Committee on 
 
232  This is consistent with Roberta Romano’s explanation of 
Delaware’s continuing dominance of incorporations. According to Romano, 
a small state such as Delaware, which derives a major portion of its 
revenues from corporation taxes, can more credibly commit to maintaining 
favorable corporate law. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces 
of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 277–78 (1985). In 
addition, scholars of American federalism have observed that state 
officials do not reliably promote state institutional interests. 
Developments in New Jersey may have been an example of state officials 
failing to defend state autonomy because federal regulation would advance 
their own “partisan, ideological, or constituent interests.” Meriam Seifter, 
States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 
953, 983 (2014). 
233  William H. Taft, Second Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1910), in 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, eds., 
2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29551 
[perma.cc/rzj4-6b6v]. 
234  See generally DEP’T ON REGULATION OF INDUS. CORPS. OF THE NAT’L 
CIVIC FED’N, THE TRUST PROBLEM (1912). 
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Interstate Commerce responded to NCF lobbying by holding 
hearings on federal control over interstate corporations. 
These hearings addressed a variety of approaches to the 
corporation issue, with particular emphasis on federal 
licensing or direct federal incorporation. They featured 
copious amounts of testimony from NCF-affiliated business 
representatives, many of whom continued to advocate for 
protective federal law. Much of this testimony advocated 
federal protection not just from state antitrust prosecution, 
but from price competition as well. Seth Low (the NCF’s 
president) called for a federal licensing system that would 
have allowed horizontal combinations and even explicit price 
fixing, so long as such combinations and collusive pricing 
were approved by a federal agency.235 Elbert Gary, of U.S. 
Steel, favored a somewhat stricter licensing law, though he 
also envisioned the federal government approving 
combinations and pricing agreements (and possibly even 
setting prices itself). According to Gary, the Sherman Act 
subjected businesses to paralyzing uncertainty, since it was 
impossible to know prior to an enforcement action whether a 
given transaction was lawful. Gary also claimed that 
allowing firms to enter horizontal agreements would benefit 
the economy by reducing economically destructive 
“unrestrained” competition.236 As a final example, coal 
industry lobbyist Walter Bogle called for protecting 
corporations from state statutes, while also allowing them to 
 
235  See Control of Corporations, Persons, and Firms Engaged in 
Interstate Commerce: Hearing on S. 2941 Before the S. Comm. on Interstate 
Commerce, 62nd Cong. 499-557 (1913) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 2941] 
(statement of Seth Low, President, National Civic Federation).  
236  Id. at 639–95, 726–30 (statement of Elbert H. Gary, Chairman and 
CEO, U.S. Steel Corp.). Gary’s enthusiasm for price fixing was not merely 
academic. Between 1907 and 1911, he had presided over the “Gary 
dinners,” industry gatherings at which American steel companies reached 
collusive (if informal) pricing agreements. These meetings had enjoyed the 
tacit blessing of the Roosevelt Administration, and were not challenged 
under the Sherman Act until the stricter antitrust enforcement of the Taft 
presidency. Gary’s statist vision of business regulation was similar to that 
of Roosevelt, and the two men maintained a friendly relationship 
throughout Roosevelt’s tenure. 
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enter into explicit price fixing agreements. Bogle’s testimony 
was representative of many witnesses before the committee, 
arguing that federal legislation should “eliminate or destroy 
disastrous competition.”237 
These various proposals were coolly received by the 
Committee on Interstate Commerce, which saw little reason 
to grant legal protections to already-powerful corporations 
and which rejected the broadly statist implications of many 
of the witnesses’ testimony. Indeed, the Senate was more 
favorably disposed to moving in the opposite direction, by 
strengthening the Sherman Act and more tightly regulating 
combinations. To the disappointment of big business, 
President Wilson adopted this approach in 1914.238 The 
corporatist vision would not be realized, either during the 
Taft Administration or after. 
B. Anti-Corporate Proposals 
The Committee on Interstate Commerce also considered 
anti-corporate proposals. While the NCF was lobbying for 
corporatist legislation, Democrats and insurgent Republicans 
also introduced several bills. The most politically significant 
of these bills were inspired by the writings of Robert R. Reed, 
a New York attorney who had published an influential 
incorporation proposal in 1909.239 Reed’s perspective was 
diametrically opposed to the goals of the NCF. Reed believed 
that monopoly power would only become more dangerous if 
domesticated by the federal government. Rather than 
seeking to control corporations through centralized 
regulation, which would constitute “the beginning of the end 
of those sound principals of government which are our 
special heritage as a people,” Reed advocated strictly limiting 
 
237  Id. at 2323–24 (statement of Walter S. Bogle, Coal Operator). 
238  In addition to creating the FTC, the Federal Trade Commission 
Act of 1914 prohibited a number of “unfair” trade practices. Similarly, the 
Clayton Act (of the same year) strengthened federal antitrust law by 
prohibiting certain acquisition transactions as well as “incipient” 
monopolization. 
239  See Robert R. Reed, American Democracy and Corporate Reform, 
ATLANTIC, Jan. 1909, at 114. 
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the size and scope of corporations themselves.240 Although 
none of the bills inspired by Reed’s writings became law, 
they illustrate the deep divide between corporatist and anti-
corporate ideologies. 
Among Reed-inspired bills, the proposal that attracted 
the greatest support was the so-called Williams Bill, 
introduced in 1911 by Senator John Sharp Williams (D-
MS).241 In its original form, the Williams Bill was not an 
incorporation measure per se, in that it nominally preserved 
the existing system of state corporation acts. However, the 
bill included strict rules regarding the business activities, 
governance, and capitalization of any corporation engaged in 
interstate commerce, such that the corporate laws of the 
several states would have been rendered largely irrelevant. 
The bill attracted little attention when first introduced in 
Congress, but was taken more seriously when Williams 
reintroduced a revised version in 1912, when it was assigned 
for consideration to the Committee on Interstate 
Commerce.242 
In presenting his bill to the Committee, Williams 
emphasized Robert R. Reed’s direct influence on the 
legislation. Not only had Williams drawn inspiration from 
Reed’s articles, he had directly corresponded with Reed 
throughout the drafting process and gave the New Yorker 
substantial credit for formulating the details of the bill.243 
The bill reflected both men’s view that government and 
business should be kept separate, and that corporate 
regulation was best administered through non-discretionary 
statutory rules. Claiming to be an opponent of centralization, 
Williams insisted that his bill was not a federal incorporation 
measure, even though its implementation would federalize 
most aspects of corporate law. This incongruence 
notwithstanding, the bill did address Williams’s fear of 
business/government corruption by removing discretionary 
 
240  Id. 
241  S. 1377, 62nd Cong. (1911). 
242  S. 4747, 62nd Cong. (1912). 
243  Hearing on S. 2941, supra note 235, at 2503–05 (statement of Sen. 
John Sharp Williams). 
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decision making from the hands of the federal executive. The 
bill set forth clear, narrow, ex ante limits on corporations 
that no government official could waive, modify, or 
reinterpret. Criticizing the regulatory proposals favored by 
many Republicans, Williams warned, “I can imagine nothing 
more dangerous to the American Republic than control of 
great corporations by a Federal bureau subject in its turn to 
a political administration of either party.”244  
Reed himself also testified in support of the Williams Bill. 
Like Williams, Reed insisted that the legislation did not 
federalize corporate law. In Reed’s view, the real issue was 
not state versus federal law, but rather the distinction 
between ex ante legal rules, which would clearly and 
specifically limit corporate abuses, and ex post discretion 
over the enforcement of malleable standards, which lent 
itself to a dangerous intercourse of government and 
corporate power.245 Reed’s perspective on corporations was 
shared by many of the nation’s newspapers, and several 
editorials were entered into the legislative record. The 
Indianapolis Star, for example, criticized protective 
regulation, calling instead for a “punitive and prohibitive” 
federal corporation act.246 The Grand Rapids Herald 
expressed a similar view, praising Reed’s plan for “radical 
reform.”247 The Pittsburg Dispatch supported vesting 
corporate law in the federal government, thereby freeing it 
from state-level corruption and restoring its focus on the 
public interest.248 This support for Reed’s proposals reflected 
widespread public demand for strict, forceful, and public-
oriented legislation. 
Notwithstanding this support, the Committee on 
Interstate Commerce declined to report any corporation bill, 
whether of the NCF or the Williams/Reed variety. Given the 
major differences of opinion regarding the basic goals of 
corporate regulation, the committee concluded that federal 
 
244  Id. at 2508 (quoting an earlier letter to Congress). 
245  See id. at 446–72 (statement of Robert R. Reed, Attorney). 
246  Id. at 2515 (statement of Sen. John Sharp Williams). 
247  Id. at 2516. 
248  Id. at 2517. 
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legislation was “neither necessary nor desirable.”249 In 
explaining its decision, the committee emphasized the 
intellectual divide between the two sides of the debate, which 
it characterized as an ideological contest between 
“competition,” on the one hand, and “regulated monopoly or 
concentration,” on the other.250 Acknowledging that “there 
are many distinguished students and highly trained thinkers 
who believe that the age of competition is past,” the 
committee nonetheless rejected the NCF’s proposals for 
government supervision of output and pricing agreements.251 
The committee was also unwilling to support restrictive 
measures such as the Williams Bill. Given the difficulty of 
reaching political agreement on any form of corporate 
legislation, the Williams Bill was no more viable than the 
pro-corporate NCF proposals. Rather than support either, 
the committee issued a vague recommendation to convert the 
Bureau of Corporations into an independent commission 
tasked with investigating corporations, enforcing federal 
antitrust law, and providing advance review of mergers and 
combinations.252 That the committee sought to defer any 
actual policymaking to a hypothetical future commission, the 
powers of which would be an unlikely combination of both 
anti-corporate and corporatist reform proposals, is testament 
to the political difficulties of corporate legislation during the 
Taft Administration. Once again, federal chartering had 
been rendered politically infeasible—not by any particular 
support for the existing system of state corporate law—but 
rather by intractable disagreement over the nature of its 
replacement. 
C. Successful Enactment of the Corporation Tax 
Although the chartering efforts of the Taft 
Administration failed, Taft did succeed in working with 
Congress to pass an alternate form of corporate legislation. 
 
249  S. REP. NO. 62-1326, at 2 (1913). 
250  Id. at 2–3. 
251  Id. at 3. 
252  Id. at 12–13. 
HUTCHISON – FINAL 
No. 3:1017]  PROGRESSIVE ERA CONCEPTIONS OF THE CORPORATION 1089 
In 1909, the Administration oversaw passage of a federal 
corporate income tax—the immediate predecessor to the 
personal income tax of 1913.253 While primarily a tax 
measure, the 1909 Act also responded to more general 
demands for corporate reform, and its enactment had the 
practical effect of reducing pressure for broader legislation. 
As Marjorie Kornhauser has documented, the corporation 
tax of 1909 advanced several progressive policy objectives, 
including mandatory corporate publicity and reduced 
overcapitalization.254 Partly due to these objectives, the tax 
was an unusual piece of legislation, serving multiple political 
goals that were often at cross-purposes. Indeed, the tax itself 
had originally been conceived by conservative Republicans as 
a means of deflecting political pressure for a federal personal 
income tax. Facing growing criticism of economic inequality 
and mounting demands for federal income taxation, many 
congressional Republicans believed a (small) corporate 
income tax was preferable to enactment of a “radical” 
personal income tax. During the legislative process, however, 
this deflection strategy was joined together with debates 
over corporate law, and the corporation tax acquired an 
additional aspect as a mild form of corporate regulation.255 
Under the new tax law, corporations were required to submit 
financial information to the federal government, achieving—
to a significant degree—the publicity desired by corporate 
reformers.256 The tax was also designed to discourage 
overcapitalization and overleveraging by limiting the 
amount of interest on debt that corporations could deduct 
from taxable income. Specifically, interest deduction was 
 
253  Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 61-5, § 38, 36 Stat. 
11 (1909) (providing revenue, equalizing duties, and encouraging the 
industries of the United States among other purposes). “Although 
Congress characterized this tax as a special excise tax on corporate profits, 
it was a corporate income tax for all intents and purposes.” Hutchison, 
supra note 19, at 102 n.19. 
254  See generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and 
the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53 (1990). 
255  Id. at 94–114. 
256  § 38, 36 Stat. at 112–17 (providing revenue, equalizing duties, and 
encouraging the industries of the United States among other purposes).  
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limited to debt “not exceeding paid-up capital,” reducing the 
incentives for corporations to carry large amounts of debt or 
unpaid stock in their capital structures.257 
The tax’s disclosure requirement addressed a variety of 
corporate evils, including monopolistic pricing, abusive trade 
practices, and the sale of overvalued stock. Although 
protecting investors from overcapitalization (that is, 
protecting them from the sale of overpriced stock) was an 
early motivation for the Act, the final version focused on 
disclosure to the government, rather than disclosure to the 
general public. Earlier versions included a provision that all 
corporate tax returns “and all documentary evidence and 
notes of testimony taken and filed in connection therewith, 
shall constitute public records and be open to inspection as 
such.”258 This language providing for public inspection was 
removed from the final bill, however. In addition, the final 
version prohibited federal officials from disclosing any 
corporate information without authorization from the 
President.259 This change was a direct response to 
conservative opposition to public disclosure—in the view of 
many business figures, disclosure to the government was 
more acceptable than disclosure to the general public. 
Although many politicians supported corporate publicity, 
and some specifically supported shareholder disclosure, 
investor protection was simply not a political priority and 
was easily discarded as part of the political bargaining 
process. 
As enacted, the corporation tax satisfied some of the 
demand for federal corporate regulation, but it was not a 
substitute for comprehensive federal law. Many progressive 
lawmakers had sought broader publicity requirements and 
were therefore disappointed with the final version of the Act. 
More to the point, the tax provided little in the way of 
substantive regulation, and beyond providing the 
 
257  Kornhauser, supra note 254, at 113.  
258  Id. 
259  § 38(7), 36 Stat. at 116 (providing revenue, equalizing duties, and 
encouraging the industries of the United States among other purposes). 
Kornhauser, supra note 254, at 113–14. 
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information necessary for assessing tax liability, it was 
unclear as to what purpose its reporting provisions were 
meant to serve. The best evidence of the Act’s inadequacy in 
the view of many corporate reformers was the fact that 
federal chartering legislation continued to be introduced in 
Congress.260  
Nevertheless, the tax’s symbolism remained important. It 
demonstrated that the Republican-controlled government 
was willing to enact corporate legislation, while at the same 
time assuring the business community that it would not 
enact anything radical. Despite disappointment with the 
tax’s relatively weak substantive provisions, it likely diffused 
at least some of the energy behind more ambitious 
chartering proposals. The enactment of additional reforms 
under the Woodrow Wilson Administration—combined with 
the seeming impossibility of agreement on federal 
chartering—would eventually lead to the end of chartering 
as a congressional legislative goal. Ultimately, in an era 
marked by ambitious reforms, the chartering movement 
would distinguish itself, both in the breadth of its political 
appeal and the decisiveness of its failure. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Woodrow Wilson’s victory in the election of 1912 spelled 
the end of federal chartering as a viable political movement. 
Despite his political identity as a Democrat and his support 
among anti-corporate populists (including William Jennings 
Bryan), Wilson himself showed little enthusiasm for any 
form of federal chartering. Like many congressional 
Democrats, Wilson rejected the Rooseveltian distinction 
between “good” and “bad” industrial trusts, and was 
suspicious of big business’s enthusiasm for federal 
regulation. Unlike his party’s populist wing, however, Wilson 
accepted the inevitability of large, integrated corporations 
and declined to support legislative attempts to dramatically 
 
260  Nor did the corporation tax placate personal income tax 
proponents. Following the Sixteenth Amendment, a personal income tax 
was enacted in 1913. 
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limit their economic power. Although Wilson’s political 
discourse included its share of anti-corporate rhetoric, a 
strict system of federal chartering was simply not on his 
political agenda.261  
The Wilson Administration did enact several alternative 
regulatory measures, however, that reduced the demand for 
comprehensive legislation. Under Wilson, the Senate finally 
adopted the Committee on Interstate Commerce’s 
recommendation for an independent commission by enacting 
the Federal Trade Commission Act in September 1914.262 
Less than a month later, the Senate enacted the Clayton Act, 
which reinforced the Sherman Act by prohibiting several 
types of “unfair” trade practices as well as “incipient” 
monopolization.263 In tandem, these two acts achieved 
important goals of both factions of corporate reformers. The 
Clayton Act appealed to anti-corporate populists who 
demanded stronger antitrust enforcement. The creation of 
the FTC, on the other hand, gave many business figures the 
greater outcome certainty of a centralized, non-judicial 
regulatory body. Although neither Act could fully satisfy 
corporate reformers’ conflicting goals, they nevertheless 
dulled the political momentum behind more ambitious 
chartering proposals. Federal incorporation was eclipsed 
altogether by the economic and political exigencies of World 
War I, and remained forgotten during the stock market boom 
and economic prosperity of the 1920s. Moreover, with the 
rise of widespread public shareholding in the decade 
following the war, corporate law would come to embody a 
new and different political character. As the public became 
increasingly involved with corporations as investors, their 
protection as such became the primary goal of federal 
 
261  The new President endorsed none of the seven incorporation bills 
introduced in the year following his inauguration. Urofsky, supra note 16, 
at 182. 
262  Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012)). 
263  Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2012)). 
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corporate regulation—a change evidenced by the federal 
securities laws of the early 1930s. 
Although the Progressive Era was the period of strongest 
support for federal chartering, similar proposals have 
reemerged twice since in American history—first during the 
New Deal, and again following the corporate governance 
scandals of the 1970s. In 1935, as the country struggled to 
recover from the Great Depression, Senator Joseph 
O’Mahoney (D-WY) proposed a federal licensing system that 
explicitly borrowed its core provisions from the Williams Bill 
of 1912.264 Responding to the political shift toward greater 
concern for investors, O’Mahoney framed his bill in terms of 
protecting corporate shareholders. In presenting his bill to 
the Senate, O’Mahoney explained that its goal was not only 
“to maintain high standards of living for labor [and] to make 
possible the adoption of fair methods of competition,” but 
also “to protect the investor from the obvious abuses of 
corporate power from which the country has suffered for a 
generation.”265 However, O’Mahoney’s bill sought to achieve 
these goals by way of a mandatory federal license that would 
have required strict adherence with labor, antitrust, and 
consumer protection standards—many of which were directly 
at odds with shareholders’ economic interests. When first 
introduced, O’Mahoney’s proposal attracted considerable 
political support and seemed to have a real possibility of 
eventually becoming law. Cast by its supporters as a 
spiritual successor to the National Industrial Recovery Act, 
the proposal was variously endorsed by President Roosevelt, 
the American Federation of Labor, and the influential 
Senator William Borah (R-ID) (who would co-sponsor a 
revised version of the bill). But as the proposal advanced in 
Congress, it was bitterly opposed by business interests, 
which had set themselves in committed opposition to any 
and all New Deal legislation.266 Even the mainstream press 
 
264  S. 3363, 74th Cong. (1935). 
265  79 CONG. REC. 12,551 (1935). 
266  Borah License Bill Lashed as Dictator Peril, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 
2, 1937, at 29; Assail License Bill as Doom of Home Rule, CHI. DAILY TRIB., 
Feb. 7, 1938, at 21; Chamber Denounces Corporation Licensing, L.A. 
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harshly criticized the measure, reflecting broader 
disillusionment with the ambitious policies of the “second” 
New Deal.267  
Beset by political criticism, the bill became stranded in 
Congress. In 1938, Roosevelt abandoned the fight for his 
most controversial economic proposals and instead 
recommended, as a face-saving measure, creation of the 
Temporary National Economic Committee (the “TNEC”), a 
special investigative body chaired by O’Mahoney and 
charged with recommending economic legislation. But the 
onset of World War II again sidelined corporate reform. After 
the war, O’Mahoney resumed his campaign to implement the 
TNEC’s legislative recommendations. But, given the 
surprisingly strong postwar economy, there was no longer 
significant political interest in fundamentally reforming 
corporate law. Although the decades following World War II 
saw major tax and antitrust legislation, Congress appeared 
increasingly willing to leave corporate law to the states. 
Federal chartering’s second revival occurred in the mid-
1970s, following a rash of corporate governance scandals at 
major American corporations. Highly publicized instances of 
fraud, negligence, and managerial incompetence at several 
major firms—combined with revelations of foreign bribery 
and illegal campaign contributions—led to new proposals for 
federalizing corporate law. In 1974, Columbia law professor 
and former SEC Chairman William Cary called for federal 
minimum standards to be imposed on state corporations.268 
In presenting his proposal, Cary specifically criticized 
Delaware, denouncing the system of state corporate law “in 
 
TIMES, Jan. 30, 1938, at 7; Manufacturers Attack Federal Licensing Bill, 
N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Feb. 7, 1938, at 5; Federal Licensing of Trade Opposed, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1938, at 4.  
267  A Bill To Halt Progress, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 9, 1938, at 16; The 
Licensing Threat, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Dec. 31, 1937; Out of the Moth Balls, 
N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Feb. 8, 1938, at 10. Historians refer to Roosevelt’s 
ambitious economic proposals of 1935–1936 as the “second” New Deal (as 
distinguished from the emergency measures of the original New Deal). 
Following the onset of a “double dip” recession in 1937–1938, these 
proposals faced significant political backlash.  
268  Cary, supra note 11, at 700–03. 
HUTCHISON – FINAL 
No. 3:1017]  PROGRESSIVE ERA CONCEPTIONS OF THE CORPORATION 1095 
which a pygmy among the 50 states prescribes, interprets, 
and indeed denigrates national corporate policy as an 
incentive to encourage incorporation within its borders.”269 
Cary’s proposal sparked a vigorous debate among legal 
scholars but had less of an impact in politics than in 
academia.270 
A more politically salient proposal came in 1976, when 
the consumer advocate Ralph Nader—together with his 
associates Mark Green and Joel Seligman—proposed federal 
incorporation of all major industrial, retail, and 
transportation firms.271 In addition to federalizing 
corporations outright, the Nader proposal called for a 
dramatic restructuring of corporate boards, assigning each 
director specific oversight over one of several “corporate 
responsibility” issues, including employee welfare, consumer 
protection, and environmental responsibility.272 Nader’s 
proposal was published in the form of an accessible, well-
written monograph, which partly inspired congressional 
hearings on federal incorporation in 1976 and 1977.273 
Although Nader’s proposal was not the sole subject of the 
hearings, it featured prominently in witness testimony, 
either as an inspiration or a foil (depending on the witness). 
In any case, these hearings failed to culminate in any 
concrete legislation, and the renascent interest in federal 
incorporation soon faded from the political scene. Part of the 
reason for this lack of legislative action was the ambitious 
nature of the Nader proposal itself, which sought to reform, 
 
269  Id. at 701. 
270  The major rejoinder to Cary’s proposal came from Yale law 
professor Ralph Winter, who argued that Delaware law provided an 
economically efficient level of shareholder protection. Winter, supra note 
12, at 254. This debate over the efficiency of Delaware law has become a 
defining feature of the corporate law literature. See supra notes 8–12 and 
accompanying text. 
271  NADER ET AL., supra note 11, at 62–74. 
272  Id. 
273  Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Hearings Before the Comm. 
of Commerce, 94th Cong. (1976); The Role of the Shareholder in the 
Corporate World: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and S’holders 
Rights and Remedies of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. (1977). 
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in dramatic fashion, nearly every aspect of corporate law, 
reaching far beyond the practical limits of what was 
politically feasible at the time. Perhaps more damning, the 
various objectives of the Nader plan were often in direct (if 
unacknowledged) conflict. Nader presented his chartering 
proposal as protecting the interests of shareholders, for 
example, while at the same time advocating expansive duties 
to consumers, labor, and community interests that would 
have almost certainly reduced shareholder value. Echoing 
both the New Deal-era O’Mahoney Bill and the Progressive 
Era chartering movement, Nader’s proposal was undermined 
by mutually inconsistent goals. 
Although debates over the merits of Delaware law 
continue,274 and federal incorporation proposals still 
occasionally appear in the academic literature,275 
comprehensive federalization of corporate law has not been 
politically viable since the 1970s. This is partly due to the 
piecemeal federalization that has occurred over the last 
several decades. Developments in federal securities 
regulation, on the part of both Congress and the SEC, have 
made increasing inroads into the internal governance of 
state-chartered corporations, steadily reducing the practical 
significance of placing corporations under direct federal 
control.  
Even more important has been the long-term shift in 
academic and political opinion regarding the fundamental 
policy objectives that corporate law is meant to achieve. 
During the Progressive Era, corporate law was often 
conceived as defining the fundamental relationship between 
corporations and society. Differing perspectives on this 
relationship gave rise to the political conflicts that defined 
the federal chartering movement. Anti-corporate reformers 
believed corporations should be limited to the small, 
 
274  See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text. 
275  See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 13, at 610–14; George 
W. Dent, Jr., For Optional Federal Incorporation, 35 J. CORP. L. 499, 499–
500 (2010); Steven A. Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law: 
Optimizing Regulatory Structures for a Race to the Top, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 
313, 347–58 (2007). 
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independent businesses that had traditionally formed the 
American economy. They therefore conceived the purpose of 
corporate law to be restricting corporations’ economic and 
political power. For their part, corporatist reformers saw 
large corporations as an inevitable feature of modern 
economic life, holding within them the economic potential to 
benefit all strata of American society. They therefore 
considered corporate law a protective form of regulation, 
curbing corporations’ excesses, perhaps, but also providing 
them with legal certainty. The modern conception of the 
corporation as a politically neutral nexus of contracts—and 
the emphasis of corporate law on reducing the agency costs 
of professional management—simply did not exist, partly 
due to a closer identity between the management and 
ownership of many large firms, but also due to a 
fundamentally different political conception of corporations 
themselves. Rather than simply a legal technology for 
organizing business and allocating capital, corporations were 
viewed, whether positively or negatively, as the political 
embodiment of economic change. 
Today, popular hostility to corporations remains a 
powerful force in American politics, but it no longer plays a 
meaningful role in actual corporate lawmaking.276 The 
 
276  In general, popular agitation has shifted from the existence of 
large corporations themselves to more specific manifestations of their 
economic and political influence. Citizens United, corporate tax avoidance, 
and financial sector regulation have all become causes célèbres among the 
political left (and among some on the right). Hillary Clinton—widely 
considered a centrist—addressed each of these issues in her 2016 
presidential campaign, illustrating the populist influence on contemporary 
mainstream politics. See Benjamin Oreskes, Clinton Pledges 
Constitutional Amendment to Overturn Citizens United Ruling, POLITICO 
(July 16, 2016, 1:28 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/hillary-
clinton-citizens-united-225658 [perma.cc/FBW8-ZHMU]; Bob Bryan, 
Hillary Clinton Rips into Wall Street and Corporate America in a Fiery 
Speech, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 3, 2016, 5:47 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/hillary-clinton-rips-wall-street-
corporations-wells-fargo-in-speech-2016-10 [perma.cc/7NEP-JUF8]. Even 
Donald Trump criticized Wall Street on the campaign trail, though his 
administration now favors reducing financial regulation. See Brent A. 
Sutton, Eight Questions About the Future of Banking Regulation Under 
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central issue of modern corporate law is no longer the 
corporation’s political legitimacy, but rather the narrower 
concern of maximizing shareholder value. In an economy in 
which most Americans are directly or indirectly corporate 
investors,277 this change in the focus of corporate law is 
entirely understandable. Moreover, assuming investor 
returns and social returns are at least roughly correlated, 
this shift is likely a positive development from a broader 
normative policy perspective. In terms of our historical 
understanding of the evolution of corporate law, however, it 
risks obscuring the much different perspectives of an earlier 
political era, in which the public interest and the interests of 
investors were often considered to be in conflict, and in 
which the former was granted intellectual and political 
priority over the latter. It is important to remember these 
earlier perspectives and the regulatory visions to which they 
aspired, if only to realize that modern corporate law could 
have taken a different form. 
Had corporate law been successfully federalized in the 
early years of the twentieth century, it may have evolved to 
reflect the same economic concerns that dominate corporate 
law today. The institutional structure of American business 
would surely look much different, however. It would likely be 
more uniform, less flexible, and subject to stricter national 
standards. It would likely be more closely attuned to the 
policy agenda of the federal government, and therefore 
beholden to the changing priorities of changing political 
leadership. Finally, the legal issues historically resolved by 
the Delaware judiciary would likely have been instead 
 
Trump, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Nov. 23, 2016), 
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277  If not through direct exposure to the stock market (mutual funds, 
pension funds, etc.), then through health, life, or property-casualty 
insurance. Judge Leo Strine suggests that ordinary Americans’ exposure 
to capital markets constitutes a form of “forced capitalism.” Leo E. Strine, 
Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the 
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of 
Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 4–5 (2007). 
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resolved by non-specialist federal courts. Whether these 
institutional differences would have been for better or for 
worse, it is important to emphasize that their failure to occur 
was not due to a commitment to corporate law federalism—a 
concept of relatively recent vintage espoused by neither side 
of the chartering debate. Both anti-corporate and corporatist 
reformers sought to replace the state-based system, but held 
fundamentally different notions regarding the nature of its 
successor. In the wake of this political conflict between 
opposing regulatory perspectives, the liberal conception of 
corporate law as embodied by the New Jersey act—in which 
size, structure, and business operations are freely 
determined by private decision making—has evolved into a 
functional and (for the most part) stable national system, 
despite the absence of direct supervision on the part of the 
federal government. Were they alive to see it, this result 
would come as a profound surprise to the corporate 
reformers of the Progressive Era, who saw federalization as 
the necessary, inevitable future of corporate law. 
 
